1 Supplementary Material

1.1 Experimental Design

Figure A1. Experimental design



Notes: Figure shows experimental design and number of participants at each stage.

1.2 Descriptive statistics

Table A1. Number of respondents by condition

Group	Total	Turned Up	Completed	1 week	8 week	24 week
Treatment	251	143	138	126	98	70
Control	251	126	126	106	83	61

Notes: Each column corresponds to a phase in the experiment.

Table A2. Covariate balance

Variable	Control	Treatment	$p - value$
Age	21.1	20.9	0.59
Female	64 %	63%	0.84
Ideology (1-10 scale)	4.5	5.1	0.03
Most common major	Engineering (10%)	Engineering (16%)	NA
Victim relationship (familial)	28%	20%	0.12
Interest in politics	1.496	1.403	0.32
Identify with a party	11%	15%	0.39
Positive emotions (index)	19.5	18.6	0.31
Negative emotions (index)	6.95	6.75	0.77
Trust in govt	0.94	0.95	0.90
N	126	138	

Notes: Treatment and control balance on key measurements.

Table A3. Perceptions of the Museum by Ideology

	Left	Right	$p-value$
The Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos...			
...objectively presented information	0.86	0.59	0.00
...exceeded my expectations	2.6	2.4	0.095
...impacted me emotionally	2.62	2.35	0.02
...inhibits societal advancement	0.12	0.73	0.00
...is important for Chileans to visit	2.82	2.47	0.00
...contained information new to me	.96	1.06	0.1
Observations	51	87	

Notes: Each row represents a separate t-test result with the outcome shown in the first column.

1.3 Dependent variable operationalization

Table A4. Dependent variable operationalization

Hypothesis	Indicator
Political institutions	Trust in the church
	Satisfaction with democracy
	Satisfaction with government
	Trust in the government
	Willingness to support a military government
	Satisfaction with the military
	Trust in the military
	Satisfaction with police
	Trust in the police
Transitional justice	The military dictatorship has not been held accountable
	The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance
	The families of the disappeared should be compensated
	Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize
	Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims
	Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned
	The military should make a public apology
	Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished

Notes: Most components are measured on a 4 point Likert scale (with 0 indicating little trust/satisfaction and 3 indicating a high level trust/satisfaction). We use a 4-point scale to prevent respondents from picking a neutral response. One exception is the "Willingness to support a military government" where respondents were only given two options (yes or no). We also use a 5 point Likert scale for the first two indicators in transitional justice, which were included as items in a larger list of common political statements for which we opted to include a neutral option.

1.4 Additional results: Divisive political issues

One additional finding not included in the main body of the paper is that a visit to the museum influences visitors' attitudes toward current policies or divisive political issues. As one participant writes:

> "The experience of reliving the events of the past made me realize how much we still lack being an inclusive democracy and guaranteeing the rights of everyone. You could appreciate how the cleavage between rich and poor was very salient during the dictatorship and still today...they still lack employment and they are always hungry which is normal in a country that favors the interests of the businesspeople and not regular people."

In this vein, we find that individuals heighten their concern with economic inequality in Chilean society. The OECD ranks Chile as the country with the second highest level of income inequality (after Mexico) (OECD 2016). Present levels of economic inequality are often linked to the neoliberal policies and the "economic miracle" that characterized the Pinochet dictatorship. Still, modern-day inequality is not a topic covered throughout the content of the museum, so any changes in views concerning this phenomenon would

likely stem from an individuals' prior concern with the topic and/or the museum's effort to provoke and influence thinking concerning contemporary social justice topics. Before and after visiting the museum, subjects indicated their agreement with a statement asserting that inequality is a problem in Chilean society. Overall, as Table A5 reports, participants who visited the museum are more likely to believe that inequality is a problem in Chilean society. These effects are higher among individuals on the right. Because individuals on the left are more likely to hold views that inequality is problematic, these findings therefore offer preliminary indications that individuals on the right and left might be moving closer together on divisive issues - even those not factoring prominently into the museum content - after visiting a transitional justice museum. Furthermore, these findings might be supportive of a conciliatory effect of the museum because, as Tepperman (2002) indicates, a reconciliation process connotes a process of "nation building" that implies addressing fundamental social inequalities.

Table A5. Perceptions of Inequality after visiting the MMDH

Divisive Political Issues	**Total population**		
	β	SE	$p-value$
Inequality is a problem in Chilean society *(0-4 scale)*	0.130	0.065	0.049*
Observations		264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Measured along a 4-point Likert scale.

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

1.5 Full regression results

Table A6. Political Institutions.

	Total population		
	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for			
Democracy *(0-3 scale)*	0.137	0.063	0.032*
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.114	0.036	0.002**
Satisfaction with			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.15	0.071	0.035*
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.04	0.072	0.603
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.102	0.071	0.156
Trust in			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.094	0.072	0.20
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.09	0.068	0.194
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.152	0.081	0.066*
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.180	0.071	0.011*
Index	0.17	0.40	0.69
Observations		264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A7. Political institutions by ideology.

	Right			Left			Interaction		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for									
Democracy	0.104	0.089	0.254	0.161	0.095	0.096^{+}	−0.020	0.035	0.592
Military government	−0.170	0.051	0.001**	−0.003	0.044	0.990	−0.010	0.019	0.630
Satisfaction with									
Government	0.078	0.087	0.383	0.255	0.130	0.054^{+}	-0.035	0.037	0.357
Military	0.006	0.095	0.982	-0.137	0.113	0.237	0.011	0.033	0.771
Police	-0.172	0.095	0.075^{+}	0.047	0.112	0.701	-0.003	0.034	0.968
Trust in									
Government	0.066	0.084	0.453	0.137	0.134	0.32	0.019	0.039	0.646
Military	-0.026	0.085	0.792	-0.153	0.111	0.176	-0.009	0.030	0.780
Police	-0.192	0.103	0.066^{+}	-0.0921	0.132	0.509	-0.033	0.039	0.424
Church	0.121	0.094	0.208	0.262	0.126	0.041*	-0.061	0.032	0.058^{+}
Observations		156			108			264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs. Right and left columns represent regressions subsetted to those falling on each side of the ideological spectrum. The interaction column presents estimates from a regression specification that includes ideology (measured on a 10-point-scale) interacted with treatment assignment.

Table A8. Transitional justice.

Transitional Justice Dependent Variables	Total population		
	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance *(0-4 scale)*	-0.320	0.147	0.032*
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable *(0-4 scale)*	-0.011	0.115	0.958
The families of the disappeared should be compensated *(0-3 scale)*	0.198	0.075	0.009***
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished *(0-3 scale)*	0.038	0.088	0.685
The military should make a public apology *(0-3 scale)*	0.182	0.105	0.088^{+}
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize *(0-3 scale)*	0.153	0.134	0.262
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims *(0-3 scale)*	-0.040	0.130	0.787
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned *(0-3 scale)*	0.217	0.092	0.020*
Index	0.97	0.50	0.06
Observations		264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted.The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A9. Transitional justice by ideology.

	Right			Left			Interaction		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance	-0.298	0.206	0.156	-0.308	0.217	0.166	0.037	0.071	0.619
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable	-0.004	0.142	1.012	-0.013	0.194	0.982	0.008	0.060	0.924
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	0.214	0.104	0.043*	0.179	0.117	0.134	0.019	0.039	0.643
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished	0.072	0.114	0.547	0.002	0.133	1.023	0.013	0.040	0.772
The military should make a public apology	0.212	0.148	0.159	0.140	0.155	0.382	0.010	0.047	0.861
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize	0.174	0.179	0.344	0.145	0.218	0.527	-0.040	0.066	0.566
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims	-0.118	0.163	0.489	0.103	0.225	0.671	-0.011	0.066	0.894
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	0.227	0.134	0.096+	0.244	0.129	0.064+	0.022	0.049	0.674
Observations		156			108			264	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Right and left columns represent regressions subsetted to those falling on each side of the ideological spectrum. The interaction column presents estimates from a regression specification that includes ideology (measured on a 10-point-scale) interacted with treatment assignment. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A10. Emotions.

	All	Right	Left
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Positive	0.71 (0.84)	0.30 (1.06)	1.69 (1.54)
Interested	0.29 (0.11)	0.20 (0.15)	0.44** (0.19)
Stimulated	0.46*** (0.13)	0.30* (0.18)	0.69*** (0.23)
Enthusiastic	−0.30*(0.14)	−0.48**(0.18)	0.07 (0.23)
Energetic	−0.18 (0.13)	−0.14 (0.17)	−0.18 (0.21)
Proud	−0.08 (0.13)	−0.24 (0.17)	0.14 (0.51)
Alert	0.04 (0.14)	0.19 (0.18)	−0.14 (0.25)
Inspired	0.68** (0.13)	0.68** (0.16)	0.67** (0.22)
Determined	−0.11 (0.13)	−0.25 (0.17)	0.13 (0.25)
Attentive	0.10 (0.12)	0.02 (0.16)	0.25 (0.28)
Active	−0.25+ (0.13)	−0.32+ (0.18)	−0.11 (0.22)
Negative	5.7** (0.67)	5.36** (0.92)	6.48** (1.08)
Tense	0.87** (0.13)	0.89** (0.17)	0.89** (0.20)
Disgusted	1.71** (0.14)	1.52** (0.17)	1.92**(0.26)
Guilty	0.38** (0.11)	0.37* (0.14)	0.52** (0.16)
Scared	0.46** (0.09)	0.41** (0.11)	0.58* (0.17)
Hostile	0.45** (0.09)	0.52** (0.12)	0.278 (0.18)
Embarrassed	0.706** (0.10)	0.68** (0.14)	0.81** (0.18)
Fearful	0.30** (0.10)	0.24+ (0.13)	0.45* (0.18)
Afraid	0.58** (0.10)	0.53** (0.13)	0.70** (0.19)
Irritable	0.25*(0.12)	0.25+(0.14)	0.25 (0.20)
Nervous	0.29* (0.11)	0.33* (0.15)	0.35+ (0.19)
Observations	264	156	108

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The first column denotes coefficients for the total sample; the second column restricts the analysis to those on the right; the third considers just those on the left. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs in parentheses.

1.6 Attrition

We analyze average differential attrition rates among treatment and control groups, as well as differential rates of attrition by covariates. As Tables A1 and A11 show, attrition did not vary significantly by treatment condition. For the administration of treatment, this was expected, as individuals did not know their assignment prior to showing up. Thus, we can rule out the possibility that subjects selected into treatment, or that those who had more favorable views toward the museum were the ones who visited. In follow-up rounds, we note that attrition rates are also stable across treatment conditions.

To measure whether or not attrition patterns differed according to subject covariates and treatment assignment, we run regression results where the dependent variable is an indicator variable reporting whether or not a subject showed up at her assigned time. To test for differential rates by covariates, we run a reduced model, without interaction terms and subsequently interact treatment assignment and subject's ideology and gender. Table A12 presents F-test results testing whether the interaction coefficient terms are equal to 0. As the results show, there do not appear to be differential attrition rates.

We also further examine how responses to follow-up surveys vary according to a number of variables collected before treatment, including political interest, visits to other museums, economic situation, emotional state, and political views. We present the results in Table A13 and note that we do not detect any systematic patterns that might affect our interpretations of results from follow-up surveys.[1]

Finally, it is possible that rather than attrition being predicted by subjects' covariates or treatment status, that it is predicted by their views toward transitional justice or the government after our intervention. Specifically, it could be the case that those who have strong pro-transitional justice attitudes are more likely to respond than those who are not, which would bias us to find results in subsequent rounds. Similarly, those most supportive of democratic institutions or unsupportive of military ones might more likely to respond. To test this notion, we employ a regression where our dependent variable is whether or not an individual participated in our follow-up survey rounds and our predictor variable is their original response to our index of political institutions and transitional justice variables, as well as individual questions that composed these indices and that obtained significant results over time. Per the results in Table A14, we do not find systematic relationships between these initial responses and the propensity to attrite in subsequent rounds, with the exception of support for military government and responses in Follow up 1, though the pattern attenuates by the second follow up. Additionally, we are reassured that the coefficient signs vary across questions and between rounds, providing additional evidence against systematic patterns.

[1] We thank Reviewer 2 for this suggestion.

Table A11. Number of respondents by condition.

Group	Total	Turned Up	Completed	1 week	8 week	24 week
Treatment	251	143	138	126	98	70
Control	251	126	126	106	83	61

Notes: Each column corresponds to a phase in the experiment.

Table A12. Test for Differential Attrition

	p-value
Experiment	0.67
1 week	0.14
8 week	0.21
24 week	0.84

Notes: Each row contains p-values from F-test results performed for each phase of the experiment.

1.7 Multiple comparisons

We adjust for multiple comparisons using the EGAP calculator (https://egap.shinyapps.io/multiple-comparisons-app/) and utilizing the Benjamini and Hochberg correction.

Table A13. Differential attrition by pre-treatment covariates.

	Follow up 1		Follow up 2		Follow up 3	
	β	$p-value$	β	$p-value$	β	$p-value$
Age	0.008	0.253	0.001	0.92	0.022	0.051^{+}
Gender	0.022	0.601	0.029	0.624	0.121	0.055^{+}
Ideology	-0.005	0.641	-0.015	0.298	-0.005	0.734
Economic situation	0.026	0.284	-0.011	0.757	-0.008	0.834
Political interest	0.002	0.933	0.023	0.546	0.005	0.898
Religiosity	-0.019	0.324	0.034	0.222	0.024	0.41
Museum visits	0.011	0.228	0.021	0.0952^{+}	0.009	0.51
Trust in government	0.011	0.704	0.032	0.439	0.077	0.086^{+}
Satisfaction in government	-0.005	0.865	0.039	0.386	0.015	0.75
Inequality is a problem	-0.009	0.735	-0.05	0.188	0.062	0.13
Positive emotions	-0.001	0.721	0.004	0.253	0.003	0.423
Negative emotions	-0.0001	0.977	0.0008	0.879	-0.004	0.438
Observations	264					

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row corresponds to a separate regression, where whether or not an individual participated in follow-up studies was regressed on responses to the variable in Column 1. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A14. Differential attrition by round 1 responses.

	Follow up 1		Follow up 2		Follow up 3	
	β	$p-value$	β	$p-value$	β	$p-value$
Political Institutions Index	0.002	0.579	-0.004	0.391	-0.004	0.486
Support for military government	-0.098	0.03^{*}	-0.077	0.232	-0.099	0.152
Transitional justice index	0.001	0.765	0.003	0.655	0.004	0.595
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	-0.004	0.867	-0.003	0.941	0.041	0.289
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	-0.015	0.566	-0.008	0.825	0.026	0.521
Positive emotions	0.001	0.715	0.00004	0.991	-0.0023	0.591
Negative emotions	-0.001	0.745	0.0002	0.952	-0.002	0.661
Observations	264					

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row corresponds to a separate regression, where whether or not an individual participated in follow-up studies was regressed on responses to the variable in Column 1. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A15. Political Institutions.

	Total population			Adjusted Significance		
	β	SE	$p-value$	$\alpha = .1$	$\alpha = .05$	$\alpha = .01$
Support for						
Democracy *(0-3 scale)*	0.137	0.063	0.031**	0.088†	0.088	0.286
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.113	0.036	0.002***	0.019†	0.019†	0.019
Satisfaction with						
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.15	0.071	0.036*	0.088†	0.088	0.088
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.039	0.072	0.610	0.672	0.672	0.672
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.103	0.071	0.156	0.248	0.248	0.248
Trust in						
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.094	0.072	0.198	0.248	0.248	0.248
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.09	0.068	0.194	0.248	0.248	0.248
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.152	0.081	0.066*	0.132	0.132	0.132
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.180	0.070	0.011*	0.056†	0.056	0.056
Political Institutions Index	0.174	0.403	0.689	0.688	0.689	0.689
Observations			264			

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: This table presents multiple comparison adjustments We utilize the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate (FDR) at varying targeted significance levels (α). Column 4 represents raw p-value. Columns 5-7 report the adjusted levels of significance for different false discovery rate thresholds. † denotes that the effect is significant at 5% with the respective α level.

Table A16. Transitional justice.

Transitional Justice Dependent Variables	Total population			Adjusted Significance		
	β	SE	$p-value$	$\alpha = .1$	$\alpha = .05$	$\alpha = .01$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance † *(0-4 scale)*	-0.320	0.147	0.032*	0.096	0.096	0.096
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable *(0-4 scale)*	-0.011	0.115	0.958	0.958†	0.958	0.958
The families of the disappeared should be compensated *(0-3 scale)*	0.198	0.076	0.009**	0.082	0.082	0.082
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished *(0-3 scale)*	0.038	0.088	0.685	0.881	0.881	0.881
The military should make a public apology *(0-3 scale)*	0.182	0.105	0.088+	0.158	0.158	0.158
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize *(0-3 scale)*	0.153	0.134	0.262	0.393	0.393	0.393
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims *(0-3 scale)*	-0.040	0.130	0.787	0.885	0.885	0.885
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned † *(0-3 scale)*	0.217	0.092	0.020*	0.091†	0.091	0.091
Transitional justice index	0.967	0.50	0.056	0.125	0.125	0.125
Observations			264			

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: This table presents multiple comparison adjustments We utilize the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate (FDR) at varying targeted significance levels (α). Column 4 represents raw p-value. Columns 5-7 report the adjusted levels of significance for different false discovery rate thresholds. † denotes that the effect is significant at 5% with the respective α level.

1.8 Museum Map

Figure A2. Museum map.



Notes: Map distributed to participants prior to treatment. Subjects were instructed to visit only the highlighted sections to ensure a constant treatment.

1.9 Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of our results, we conduct three analyses: 1) we analyze stability in our outcome variables; 2) we recode ideology; and 3) we drop missing variables. Note that none of these checks jeopardizes the results found in the paper.

1.10 Stability in persistence results

In Figure A3, we consider responses to each variable we test for persistence. We divide our sample according to treatment group and ideology. We dichotomize our variables and then estimate the number of waves across each group that individuals answer affirmatively, and plot the results. For example, reading the top left pane, 92% of those in the control group on the left express support for pardoning perpetrators in 0 waves whereas 4% of the same group expresses support across all 4 waves. In this way, high percentages on 0 and 4 correspond to persistence across waves. We note that our respondents display remarkable stability across

Figure A3. Persistence of responses across treatment groups and ideologies.



all our variables except satisfaction with democracy; effects on this variable, however, did not persist in our follow-up analyses per Figure 4.

1.10.1 Recoding ideology

In our original analysis, we coded right as those greater than 4 on a 0-10 ideology scale. To test the robustness of our results, we now code those greater than 5 as right and those less than or equal to 5 as left.

Table A17. General museum impressions.

	Left	Right	$p-value$
The Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos...			
...objectively presented information *(0-4 scale)*	0.83	0.47	0.00
...exceeded my expectations *(0-4 scale)*	2.6	2.28	0.02
...impacted me emotionally *(0-4 scale)*	2.63	2.17	0.00
...inhibits societal advancement *(0-4 scale)*	0.2	0.98	0.00
...is important for Chileans to visit *(0-4 scale)*	2.8	2.3	0.00
...contained information new to me *(0-4 scale)*	1.00	1.13	0.11
Observations	83	55	

Notes: Each row represents a separate t-test on the variable specified in the left-most column. All variables are measured along a 4-point Likert scale (from 0 = no agreement to 3 = complete agreement (i.e., higher values indicating higher levels of agreement)).

Table A18. Political institutions by recoded ideology.

	Right			Left			Interaction		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for									
Democracy	0.164	0.122	0.192	0.166	0.074	0.027*	-0.020	0.035	0.592
Military government	-0.149	0.079	0.067+	-0.105	0.044	0.019*	-0.010	0.019	0.628
Satisfaction with									
Government	0.100	0.123	0.435	0.213	0.088	0.018*	-0.035	0.037	0.357
Military	−0.015	0.136	0.946	-0.065	0.093	0.506	0.011	0.033	0.771
Police	-0.172	0.156	0.284	-0.092	0.081	0.264	-0.003	0.034	0.968
Trust in									
Government	0.143	0.110	0.206	0.137	0.134	0.320	0.019	0.039	0.646
Military	-0.144	0.114	0.217	-0.075	0.087	0.408	-0.010	0.030	0.780
Police	-0.279	0.139	0.050+	-0.120	0.101	0.246	-0.033	0.039	0.424
Church	0.126	0.120	0.310	0.213	0.091	0.021*	−0.061	0.032	0.058+
Observations		89			175			264	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A19. Transitional justice by recoded ideology.

	Right			Left		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance	-0.313	0.288	0.289	-0.323	0.173	0.066+
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable	0.180	0.206	0.399	-0.098	0.139	0.501
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	0.429	0.156	0.008**	0.132	0.088	0.142
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished	0.044	0.158	0.811	0.069	0.103	0.521
The military should make a public apology	0.229	0.206	0.280	0.173	0.125	0.172
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize	-0.202	0.236	0.410	0.306	0.165	0.068+
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims	-0.091	0.236	0.725	0.012	0.1634	0.977
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	0.435	0.182	0.020**	0.111	0.108	0.314
Observations		89			175	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

1.10.2 Dropping missing values

Per our pre-analysis plan, we recoded missing values to their means. The following tables reproduce our main results while dropping missing values.

Table A20. Political institutions - dropped missing observations.

	Total population			
	β	SE	$p-value$	Obs
Support for				
Democracy *(0-4 scale)*	0.113	0.062	0.072*	255
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.112	0.037	0.003**	253
Satisfaction with				
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.157	0.073	0.035*	253
Military *(0-43scale)*	-0.044	0.073	0.562	250
Police *(0-4 scale)*	-0.119	0.072	0.105	253
Trust in				
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.073	0.073	0.329	253
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.119	0.070	0.091+	254
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.179	0.083	0.033*	254
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.189	0.072	0.009**	254

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Table A21. Transitional justice - dropping missing observations.

Transitional Justice Dependent Variables	**Total population**			
	β	SE	$p-value$	Obs
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance *(0-4 scale)*	-0.330	0.148	0.028*	258
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable *(0-4 scale)*	-0.018	0.117	0.908	257
The families of the disappeared should be compensated *(0-3 scale)*	0.187	0.076	0.015*	252
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished *(0-3 scale)*	0.048	0.089	0.613	258
The military should make a public apology *(0-3 scale)*	0.194	0.106	0.071^{+}	259
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize *(0-3 scale)*	0.167	0.135	0.226	259
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims *(0-3 scale)*	-0.023	0.130	0.894	258
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned *(0-3 scale)*	0.215	0.094	0.023*	258

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Heteroscedastic consist robust SEs.

1.11 Differences between baseline sample and experimental sample

A total of 1,172 randomly sampled university students responded to the initial version of our baseline survey. This version contained questions that measured basic demographics and covariates that would later be used for blocking (gender and ideology), as well as some more substantive measures of attitudes concerning the Pinochet dictatorship. We parsed responses to this survey according to whether or not the respondents ended up participating in our study (some were later excluded because they had already been to the museum or because they were unwilling or unable to participate). Table A22 shows that our experimental participants were more likely to be female than our original sample, though the difference is not statistically significant. Our participants were also less likely to approve of prosecuting those who were implicated in human rights violations during the Pinochet regime. We control for gender in all model specifications, and we find no significant results concerning the treatment's impact on views toward judicial action. It is possible that the imbalance in preferences toward prosecution could cause us to underestimate treatment effects on related outcome measures.

Table A22. Balance on measurements collected at baseline among nonparticipants and participants.

Variable	Participants	Nonparticipants	$p-value$
Female	68 %	62%	0.16
Ideology (1-10 scale)	5.05	4.80	0.20
Agreement with the following statement (0-4)			
Pinochet brought prosperity and order to Chilean society	2.84	2.95	0.41
Indicate if you think the event was very bad (0) or very good (4) for Chile			
Pinochet's detention in London in 1998	3.04	3.10	0.52
Prosecuting those implicated in human rights violations	2.40	2.75	0.015

Notes: Group means and p-values from t-tests comparing participants and non-participants.