national identities, are among the four wealthiest regions in the country.

In research conducted with Alexander Kuo and Jose Fernandez-Albertos, we explore the public opinion dimension to this issue, and seek to measure more carefully actual preferences for inter-regional redistribution at the individual level using 2012 survey data from Spain. Our survey data give some sense of the correlates of individual-level support for different regional policy issues. Even across countries where regional demands are salient, there has been relatively less exploration of preferences for distribution across regions in contrast to the voluminous literature on inter-personal redistribution. We also explore preferences for political centralization and, within Catalonia, preferences for supporting independence in a hypothetical referendum. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics in our data, suggesting an obvious "clash of preferences" between Spain and Catalonia. Indeed, most Spaniards outside of Catalonia (n=1428, control group) prefer more redistribution from richer to poorer regions, and also strongly prefer increased political centralization. In contrast, in Catalonia most respondents (n = 227, control group) oppose redistribution from richer to poorer regions and almost half of them oppose the central government having more control over the regions[1]. In addition, 54% of respondents in Catalonia favor independence.

What explains the diverging set of preferences in Catalonia and the rest of Spain? More broadly, to what extent are political economy models versus "identity-oriented" explanations more important in explaining these preferences? In our research, we use observational data and experiments embedded in survey data to try to disentangle these factors.

In our data, we find quite limited support for the most straightforward political economic models that incorporate both individual and regional income as relevant predictors. As expected, individuals in poorer regions tend to be more supportive of regional redistribution, though the effect is quite modest (moving from the richest to the poorest region among Spain's 19 regions increases support for regional redistribution by 10-12 percentage points). The effect of individual income is nonetheless quite limited in most regions. It turns out that individuals are not fully informed about their own region's place in the distribution, as Figure 1 shows[2]. We employ an experimental design to see whether randomly informing some individuals of the region's correct placement matters and we find that, on average, individuals who learn their region is poorer than thought are more supportive of such redistribution. As for individuals who learn their region is richer than thought, the effect of information is partially driven by individuals who learn their regions are net contributors or not. Within the region of Madrid, however, poor individuals who learn Madrid is richer become more hostile towards redistribution, providing some interesting (though limited) support of models in which poor individuals in rich regions oppose transfers out of their regions (Beramendi 2012). The rationale is that these beneficiaries of redistribution prefer redistribution to take place within regions instead of between regions. This finding is also coherent with the intuition that poorer citizens in wealthier regions often support independence movements; this intuition should nonetheless be more systematically tested[3].

To what extent are preferences for regional redistribution and political institutional arrangements linked? In Catalonia, our data confirms that there is a significant correlation between preferences against regional redistribution and support for independence, but this relationship could vary across contexts and time periods. We also find that identity matters, independently of fiscal considerations. For example, language (i.e. mother tongue) is one of the most significant factors explaining support for independence in Catalonia, regardless of individual income (Figure 2).

What about identity-based arguments for regional redistribution? In our data from Spain, we find that the Basque Country and Catalonia are the regions where people show the least support for inter-regional redistribution (consistent with Amat 2012). At the individual level, we isolated the causal impact of "out-group" concerns by experimentally manipulating cultural primes; we did so by having respondents in the sample (in all regions) randomly evaluate some "out-group" regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country); within Catalonia, they randomly evaluated other regions.

1 In Catalonia 60% believe that some regions should have more autonomy for historical reasons; 80% of Spaniards (outside Catalonia) disagree with this statement and favor "equal treatment" of all regions.

2 There is generally a moderating bias as individuals in rich regions underestimate their regions' relative position, and individuals in poor regions overestimate.

3 Secessionist parties such as the SNP (in Scotland) and ERC (in Catalonia) make claims about the preservation of the welfare state and benefits that they argue are not possible to guarantee under the unity with Spain and the UK. In Scotland there is a significant correlation, at the Local Authority level, between work benefit claimants and Yes vote in the recent referendum (Ayres 2014).

Table 1. Clash of Preferences (% of respondents in the control groups)

	Regional Redistribution		Centralization		Independence
	Spain (excluding Cat)	Catalonia	Spain (excluding Cat)	Catalonia	Catalonia
In favor	**57**	23	**76**	36	**54**
Neutral	20	16	17	16	19
Against	23	**61**	7	**48**	28