

London School of Economics & Political Science  
Department of Government  
2025-2026

GV4D7: Dilemmas of Equality  
Autumn Term 2025

Course instructor: Dr Sarah Goff ([s.goff@lse.ac.uk](mailto:s.goff@lse.ac.uk))

Lecture: Wednesdays, 10.00-11.00 in CBG.1.01

Seminars: There are two seminar groups, both on Wednesdays. One meets 15.00-16.00 and the other 16.00-17.00. The room for both is FAW.3.04.

Office hours: Thursdays 14.00-15.00 in Centre Building 3.12. Please book an appointment using Student Hub. Email me for other arrangements if you are unable to make this time or all appointments are booked.

### **Availability**

For MSc Political Theory; MSc in Inequalities and Social Science; MSc Gender; MSc Gender, Development and Globalisation; MSc Gender, Media and Culture; MSc Gender, Policy and Inequalities; and MSc Human Rights. This course is available as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit.

This course is capped at 2 groups.

### **Course content**

This is a course in contemporary political theory. It starts with the general question of why (or if) equality matters. It then introduces some of the major debates in the contemporary literature on equality. These debates include: the appropriate metric for making comparisons between persons; the difference between equality, priority, and sufficiency; and the relationship between equality and justice. Throughout the course, and particularly in the latter half, we consider concrete social problems and dilemmas faced by those who are committed to the ideal of equality.

### **Teaching**

Ten 1 hour lectures and ten 1 hour seminar sessions in the Autumn Term. Students are expected to do preparatory reading for each week's seminar, and also to participate in the discussion and other activities.

## **Coursework**

Students have the option to submit a short formative essay (up to 1500 words), and they are strongly encouraged to do so. These formative essays are to be submitted as Word documents through the Moodle site, at the end of the reading week. If students submit their formative essays by this date, they will receive feedback in good time from the course instructor before the assessed essays are due.

Students must submit a 4500 word essay, which counts for 100% of the total marks for the course. Question prompts will be provided by the instructor.

## **Course outline:**

Week 1: Introduction

Week 2: Equality and priority

Week 3: Equality of what?

Week 4: The capabilities approach

Week 5: Relational equality

Week 6: Reading week: no class meetings, formative essays due

Week 7: Poverty and having enough

Week 8: Hierarchies of social status, moral worth, and merit

Week 9: Class and educational opportunities

Week 10: Discrimination

Week 11: Wages and valuing workers' skills

## **Course readings**

### **Week 1: Introduction (1 October)**

This week motivates the course's study of equality by examining several arguments concerning contemporary social issues. These arguments evaluate group-based disparities in educational opportunities, everyday experiences of gender discrimination, and child poverty in low income families. By the end of the course, students will have the tools to assess these normative arguments.

#### **Essential reading:**

Brennan, S. (2009) Feminist Ethics and Everyday Inequalities. *Hypatia* 24, no. 1, pp. 141-159

Anderson, E. (2012) Race, culture, and educational opportunity. *Theory and Research in Education* 10, no. 2, pp. 105-129.

O'Neill, M. (2024) Is it fair to remove the two-child limit on benefits? *Fairness Foundation* (<https://fairnessfoundation.com/two-child-limit>)

#### **Further Reading**

Arneson, R. (2013) Egalitarianism. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (ed. Edward N. Zalta) (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/>)

Myers, C. K. et. al. (2010) Ladies first? A Field Study of Discrimination in Coffee Shops. *Journal of Applied Economics* 42, no. 14, pp. 1751-69.

Card, C. (1998) Evils and Inequalities. *Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues* 9, pp. 87-101

Brennan, S. (2016) The Moral Status of Micro-Inequalities. In *Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics*. Oxford University Press.

McTernan, E. (2018) Microaggressions, Equality, and Social Practices. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 26, pp. 261-281.

Chandhoke, N. (2012) Why People Should Not Be Poor. *Economic & Political Weekly* xlvi, no. 14, pp. 41-50.

## **Week 2: Equality and priority (8 October)**

This week considers principles for evaluating how goods are distributed. Is it a better state of affairs when goods are distributed equally between people? How can inequalities be justified to the persons disadvantaged by them?

### Essential reading:

Nagel, T. (1979) Equality. In *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 106-127 (ebook).

Parfit, D. (1997) Equality and Priority. *Ratio* 10, no. 3, pp. 202-221.

### Further Readings

O'Neill, M. (2008) What Should Egalitarians Believe? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 36, no. 2, pp. 119-56.

Brown, A. (2014) What Should Egalitarians Believe if They Really Are Egalitarian? a Reply to Martin O'Neill. *European Journal of Political Theory* 13, no. 4, pp. 453-69.

Temkin, L. (2003) Egalitarianism Defended. *Ethics*, 113, no. 4, pp. 764-782.

Norman, R. (1997) The Social Basis of Equality. *Ratio* 10, no. 3, pp. 238-252.

## **Week 3: Equality of what? (15 October)**

This week begins our investigation into what it is, exactly, that ought to be equalized

between persons. This week's readings consider welfare, or the satisfaction of preferences, as a potential answer to the "equality of what" question.

### Essential readings

Dworkin, R. (1981) What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10, no. 3, pp. 185-246

Scanlon, T. M. (1975) Preference and Urgency. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 19, Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, pp. 655-669

### Further readings

Dworkin, R. (1981) What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10, no. 4, pp. 283-345

Sen, A. (1980) Equality of What? *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*  
<http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/sen80.pdf>

Dworkin, R. (2002) Sovereign Virtue Revisited. *Ethics* 113, no. 1, pp. 106–143.

Cohen, G.A (1989) On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. *Ethics* 99, pp. 906-44

Cohen, G.A. (2004) Expensive Taste Rides Again. In (ed) Justine Burley, *Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Arneson, R (2000) Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 30, No. 4, pp. 497-524.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2013). Offensive Preferences, Snobbish Tastes, and Egalitarian Justice. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 44, no. 4, pp. 439–458.

### **Week 4: The capabilities approach (22 October)**

This week continues our discussion of the "equality of what" question. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen argue that all individuals should have the capability to take part in valuable "beings and doings," even if they have "adaptive preferences" not to have these freedoms. We evaluate a challenge to this approach from Elizabeth Barnes, namely: the capabilities approach fails to respect the first-person perspective of disabled people who accept their disabilities.

### Essential Readings:

Nussbaum, M. (2011) *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Chapter 2: The Central Capabilities. Harvard University Press.

Barnes, E. (2009) Disability and Adaptive Preference. *Philosophical Perspectives* 23, no. 1: 1–21.

### Further readings

Robeyns, I. (2016) The Capabilities Approach, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/>

Sen, A. (1999) excerpt from *Development as Freedom*, Chapter 4: Poverty as Capability Deprivation (pp. 87-110)

Nussbaum, M. (1992) Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism. *Political Theory* 20, No. 2, pp. 202-246

Cureton, A. (2018) Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled. In (Eds. Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) *Disability in Practice: Attitudes, Policies, and Relationships*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2000) *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-15; 70-86 (e-book)

Nussbaum, M. (2003) Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. *Feminist Economics* 9, no. 2&3, pp. 33-60

Robeyns, I. (2005). The Capability Approach: a Theoretical Survey. *Journal of Human Development*, 6 (1), 93–117.

Robeyns, I. (2006) The Capability Approach in Practice. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14, no. 3, pp. 351–376.

Robeyns, I. (2003) Sen's capability approach and gender inequality: selecting relevant capabilities, *Feminist Economics*, 9(2-3), pp. 61-92.

Wolff, J. and Avner de-Shalit, (2007) *Disadvantage*, Chapter 1: The Pluralism of Disadvantage (e-book)

Nussbaum, M. (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 5 Adaptive Preferences and Women's Options. *Economics and Philosophy* 17, pp. 67-88.

Barnes, E. (2016) *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barclay, L. (2012) Natural Deficiency or Social Oppression? The Capabilities Approach to Justice for People with Disabilities. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 9, no. 4, pp. 500-520.

Begon, J. (2014) What Are Adaptive Preferences? Exclusion and Disability in the Capability Approach. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32, no. 3, pp. 241–57.

### **Week 5: Relational equality (29 October)**

This week will focus on the contrast between relational equality and luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism holds that it is wrong for people to be disadvantaged by circumstances for which they are not responsible (bad luck). Relational equality often understands relationships of equality, particularly between citizens in a democracy, to be requirements of justice.

#### Essential Readings

Anderson, E. (1999) What is the Point of Equality? *Ethics* 109, no. 2, pp. 287–337.

Scheffler, S. (2005) Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality. *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics* 4, no. 1, pp. 5-28.

#### Further Readings

Voigt, K. (2007) The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck? *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 389-407

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (1999). Are Some Inequalities more Unequal than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality. *Utilitas*, 16(2), pp. 193–219.

Scheffler, S. (2003) What is Egalitarianism? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 31, no. 1, pp. 5-39.

Anderson, E. (2008) How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks? *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 9, pp. 239-270.

Voigt, K. (2018) Relational Equality and the Expressive Dimension of State Action. *Social Theory & Practice* 44, no. 3, pp. 437-467

Voigt, K. (2020) Relational Egalitarianism. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1387

Voigt, K. and Wester, G. (2015) Relational Equality and Health. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31, no. 2, pp. 204-229.

Fourie, C. (2016) Sufficiency of Capabilities, Social Equality, and Two-Tiered Health Care Systems. In Carina Fourie and Annette Rid (Eds.) *What is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and Health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Preda, A. and Voigt, K. (2015) The Social Determinants of Health: Why Should We Care?

Axelsen, D. and Nielsen, L. (2020) Harsh and Disrespectful: Respecting Moral Agency and Choice, *Social Theory and Practice* 46, no. 4, pp. 657-679

Albertsen, A. and Nielsen, L. (2020) What's the Point of the Harshness Objection? *Utilitas* 32, no. 4, pp. 427-443.

Hojland, A.-S. (2021) What Should Egalitarian Policies Express? The Case of Paternalism, *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 29, no. 4, pp. 519-538.

Hojland, A.-S. (2022) What Should Relational Egalitarians Believe? *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 21, no. 1, pp. 55-74.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2015). Luck egalitarians versus relational egalitarians: on the prospects of a pluralist account of egalitarian justice. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 45(2), pp. 220–241.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2018). *Relational egalitarianism: Living as equals*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

### **Week 6: Reading week**

This week we will not have lecture or seminars. Please take the opportunity to write a formative essay, which will be due at the end of the week.

### **Week 7: Poverty and having enough (12 November)**

This week considers material deprivation and what it means to be poor. One position is that everyone should “have enough” material resources (money) to be content, and it is not important for resources to be equally distributed. Other views to be considered this week describe how material deprivation can affect self-respect, status, and agency.

#### Essential readings

Wolff, J. (2020) 'Beyond Poverty', in (eds.) V. Beck et al., *Dimensions of Poverty: Measurement, Epistemic Injustices, Activism* ([https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31711-9\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31711-9_2))

Frankfurt, H. (2000) The Moral Irrelevance of Equality. *Public Affairs Quarterly* 14, pp. 87–103.

Ci, J. (2013) Agency and Other Stakes of Poverty. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 21, no. 2, pp. 125-150.

#### Further readings

Wolff, J. (1998) Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*

27, no. 2, pp. 97–122.

Frankfurt, H. (1987) Equality as a Moral Ideal. *Ethics* 98, no. 1, pp. 21-43

Frankfurt, H. (1997) Equality and Respect. *Social Research* 64, pp. 3–15.

Casal, P. (2007) Why Sufficiency is Not Enough. *Ethics* 117, no. 2, pp. 296-326

Huseby, R. (2010) Sufficiency: Restated and Defended. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18, no. 2, pp. 178–197.

Wolff, J. (2015) Political Philosophy and the Real World of the Welfare State. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32, pp. 360-372

Wolff, J. (2010). Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited. *The Journal of Ethics*, 14(3-4), 335–350.

Kabeer, N. (2000). Social Exclusion, Poverty and Discrimination: Towards an Analytical Framework. *Ids Bulletin*, 31(4), pp. 1–15.

Deveaux, M. (2018). Re-evaluating Sufficiency in Light of Evidence of Inequality's Harms. *Ethics and Social Welfare* 12, no. 2, pp. 97-116.

Axelsen, D. and Nielson, L. (2015). Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23, 4, pp. 406-426.

Putnam, D. (2020). Poverty as a Social Relation. *Dimensions of Poverty: Global Poverty Measurement in Philosophical, Economic, and Social Perspective*. Valentin Beck, Henning Hahn, and Robert Lepenies, editors. Springer.

Wolff, J. (2019) Poverty. *Philosophy Compass* 10, pp. 283–10.

Harting, V. (2024) Distributive sufficiency, inequality-blindness, and disrespectful treatment, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 27, no. 4 (<https://doi-org.lse.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/13698230.2021.1952387>)

### **Week 8: Hierarchies of social status, moral worth, and merit (19 November)**

This week will consider objections to inequalities, distinguishing between what matters intrinsically and what matters instrumentally. One potential issue of intrinsic value concerns status and a society's conventional meanings of respect for individuals' moral worth and merit. These conventional meanings might be significant also in virtue of their effects on individuals' self-respect and self-understanding.

#### Essential Readings

Scanlon, T. (2003) The Diversity of Objections to Inequality. In *The Difficulty of Tolerance*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-218 (ebook)

Fourie, C. (2011). What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal. *Res Publica* 18, no. 2, pp. 107–126.

### Further readings

Scanlon, T.M. (2017) *Why does inequality matter?* Oxford University Press

Fourie, C. (2015) To praise and to scorn. In C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, & I. Wallimann-Helmer (Eds.), *Social equality: On what it means to be equals* (pp. 45–64). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Miller, W. I. (1995) Upward Contempt. *Political Theory* 23, no. 3, pp. 476–99.

Wolff, J. (2013). Scanlon on Social and Material Inequality. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 10, no. 4, pp. 406–425.

Wolff, J. (2017). Forms of Differential Social Inclusion. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 34(01), 1–22.

Schuppert, F. (2015). Non-domination, non-alienation and social equality: towards a republican understanding of equality. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 440–455

Kolodny, N. (2014) Rule over None I: What Justifies Democracy? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, 3, pp. 195-229.

Kolodny, N. (2014) Rule over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, 4, pp. 287-336.

González-Ricoy, I. and Queralt, J. (2018). Political Liberties and Social Equality. *Law and Philosophy* 37, 6, pp. 613-638.

Garrau, M., & Laborde, C. (2015). Relational equality, non-domination, and vulnerability. In C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, & I. Wallimann-Helmer (Eds.), *Social equality: On what it means to be equals* (pp. 45–64). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, E. (2015). Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Republican Insights. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31, no. 2, pp. 48-69.

Preda, A. and Voigt, K. (2023) Shameless luck egalitarians. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 54, no. 1, pp. 41-58.

Porro, C. (2021) Esteem, Social Norms, and Status Equality, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 24, no. 4, pp. 901-915.

### **Week 9: Class and educational opportunities (26 November)**

This week returns to questions about choice, responsibility, and institutions that influence groups' different opportunities. In particular, we will be interested in applying these ideas to questions about class and educational opportunities.

#### Essential Readings

Elford, G. (2015). Social Class, Merit and Equality of Opportunity in Education. *Res Publica*, 22(3), 267–284.

Halliday, D. (2019) Inequality and Economic Segregation. In *Inheritance of Wealth: Justice, Equality, and the Right to Bequeath*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

#### Further Readings

Chambers, C. (2009) Each outcome is another opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 8, no. 4, pp. 374–400.

Brown, A. (2006) Equality of Opportunity for Education: One Off or Lifelong? *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 40, no. 1, pp. 63-84.

Brighouse, H., & Swift, A. (2006). Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods. *Ethics*, 116(3), 471–497.

Swift, A. (2003) *How Not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent*. London: Routledge Press.

Friedman S., Laurison, D., and Miles, A. (2015) Breaking the 'Class' Ceiling? Social Mobility into Britain's Elite Occupations. *The Sociological Review* 63, no. 2, pp. 259-289.

Lareau, A. (2011) *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Haslanger, S. (2014) Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunities, and Disrespect. *Du Bois Review*, 11(1), pp. 109-136.

Mijs, J. B. (2016) The Unfulfillable Promise of Meritocracy: Three Lessons and Their Implications for Justice in Education. *Social Justice Research* 29, pp. 4–34

Sayer, A. (2005). Responses to class: egalitarianism, respect(ability), class pride, and moral boundary-drawing. In *The Moral Significance of Class*. Cambridge University Press.

Mason, A. (2006) *Levelling the Playing Field: the Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian Thought*. Oxford University Press, pp 15-38, and 216-223 (e-book)

Phillips, A. (2004) Defending Equality of Outcome. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 1, pp. 1-19

Anderson, E. (2010) *The Imperative of Integration*. Princeton University Press.

Segall, S. (2011) If you're a luck egalitarian, how come you read bedtime stories to your children? *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 14, no. 1, pp. 23-40.

### **Week 10: Discrimination (3 December)**

This week considers whether and how discrimination violates principles of equality. We will consider whether discrimination must entail comparatively worse treatment of one social group over another, if certain actions are discriminatory because of their social meanings, and how discrimination relates to the freedom of individuals and commercial actors.

#### Essential Readings

Hellman, D. (2011) *When is Discrimination Wrong?* Harvard University Press, Chapter 2: Demeaning and Wrongful Discrimination, pp. 34-58.

Steuwer, B. (2025) Private discrimination, marriage markets, and caste. *Theoria* 91, no. 3, pp. 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12536>

#### Further Readings

Fogg-Davis, H. (2014) Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: an Intersectional Critique, *Perspectives on Politics*

Moreau, S. (2020) Chapter 3 in *Faces of Inequality: a Theory of Wrongful Discrimination*. Oxford University Press.

Moreau, S. (2013). In Defense of a Liberty-Based Account of Discrimination. In ed. Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, *Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law*. Oxford University Press.

Altman, A. (2011) Discrimination. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Alexander, L. (1992) What makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 141(1), pp. 149–219.

- Davis, H. F. (2014) Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: An Intersectional Critique. *Perspectives on Politics*. 12, no. 4, pp. 45-60.
- Moreau, S. (2004) The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment, *University of Toronto Law Journal* 54 (3) pp. 291-326.
- Eidelson, B. (2015) *Discrimination and Disrespect*, Oxford University Press (Chapter 4, Respect for Equality, pp. 95-124).
- Arneson, R. (2006) What is Wrongful Discrimination? 43 *San Diego L. Rev.* 775-808
- Lippert-Ramsussen, K. (2014) *Born Free and Equal?* Oxford University Press.
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2006). The Badness of Discrimination. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9: 167-85.
- Holmes, E. (2005) Anti-discrimination rights without equality. *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 175-194
- Segall, S. (2012). What's So Bad About Discrimination? *Utilitas* 24, no. 1, pp. 82–100.
- Wertheimer, A. (1983) Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, *Ethics* 94(1), pp. 99–112.
- Slavny, A. and Parr, T. (2015). Harmless Discrimination. *Legal Theory* 21, pp. 100–114.
- Thomsen, F. K. (2013) But Some Groups Are More Equal Than Others. *Social Theory and Practice* 39, no. 1, pp. 120–46.
- Crenshaw, K. (1982) A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in *The Politics of Law: a Progressive Critique*.

### **Week 11: Wages and valuing workers' skills (10 December)**

This week integrates many ideas from the course, including: equality versus priority for the least advantaged, distributions and social status, opportunities and merit, and discrimination on the basis of group membership. We will apply these ideas to questions about wage levels and how society should value workers with different skills.

#### Essential readings

- Christensen, J., Tom Parr, and David V. Axelson (2022) Justice for Millionaires? *Economics and Philosophy* 38, no. 3, pp. 333-353.
- Schemmel, C. and Picot, G. (2025) Why We Need Minimum Wages: Pay, Recognition, and Economic Citizenship, *American Political Science Review* 119, no. 3, pp. 1258-1271 (<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424001096>)

### Further readings

Lim, D. (2017) Selecting Immigrants by Skill: A Case of Wrongful Discrimination? *Social Theory and Practice* 43, no. 2, pp. 369-396

Dobos, N. (2018) Exploitation, Working Poverty, and the Expressive Power of Wages. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*.

Jutten, T. (2017) Dignity, Esteem, and Social Contribution: A Recognition-Theoretical View. *Journal of Political Philosophy*.

Olson, K. (2012) Our Choices, Our Wage Gap? *Philosophical Topics*.

Goff, S. (2016) How to Trade Fairly in an Unjust Society: The Problem of Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market. *Social Theory and Practice*. 42, no. 3, pp. 555-580.

Parr, T. (2021) Automation, Unemployment, and Taxation. *Social Theory & Practice*.

Schemmel, C. (2011) Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care about Distributions. *Social Theory and Practice* 37, pp. 365–390.

Schemmel, C. (2011) Distributive and Relational Equality. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 11, no. 2, pp. 123–148.

Lim, D. (2023) *Immigration and Social Equality: The Ethics of Skill-Selective Immigration Policies*. Oxford University Press.

Robeyns, I. (2016) Having Too Much. In J. Knight and M. Schwartzberg (eds.) *NOMOS LVI: Wealth. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*, New York University Press.