GOV 390L / LAS 384L Political Parties and Party Systems

(Spring 2021)

Online

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Office hours: T 11:45-2:45

Course meets: Th 12:30-3:30
Unique: GOV 38940

Political parties are endemic to political regimes that permit electoral competition, but core debates about them remain unsettled. In this graduate seminar, we will explore party origins, intra-party politics, the dynamics of inter-party competition, and party system development. We will also look at the models of voting behavior that undergird alternative theories of partisan competition as well as several special types of parties and party systems, including ethnic parties, dominant parties, and parties in authoritarian regimes. The course focuses on party theory with illustrative examples drawn from the United States as well as countries in Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa.

Grading. Your responsibilities include the following main components:

1. Verbal participation in seminar discussions (20%).
2. Each week, write a one-page reaction to the readings (10%). This may be an analytic summary, a critique, or a combination of the two. E-mail me the summary each Wednesday by 5:00 p.m.
3. Book review (10%): Decide on a book by January 30. Then, by February 11, hand in a 5-page paper (no longer!) that is modeled on a professional book review like one would find in a leading political science journals. For examples, consult *Perspectives on Politics* and older editions of *Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, Political Science Quarterly,* among others. Please choose one of the substantive books from the syllabus, not a technical one and not an edited volume.
4. In-class presentation (10%): On April 29 and May 6, students will present their research projects to the class. These will be 12-minute conference style presentations using slides.
5. Research paper (50%): Write a 20-30-page research paper. The paper must clearly engage political party theory. Most students should develop and test hypotheses using qualitative and/or quantitative data. Students that plan to take their comprehensive exam in Theory may write a purely theoretical paper. Important dates:
    - By February 18, hand in a brief statement of your research question. If the question is easily interpretable, this can be very brief. If interpretation requires some description, limit the statement to one page.
    - By March 4, hand in a 2-3-page prospectus that includes the research question, why we should care about having an answer to this question, some plausible explanations, an initial research plan, a preliminary bibliography of at least a few main sources, and a

planned work schedule. I may ask you to re-write portions of the prospectus on a short timeline as we fine-tune your topic.

- By April 1, hand in a draft of the front-end of your paper, including an abstract, either an introduction or just a paragraph that outlines the paper, the titles for the major sections, your critique of the existing literature, the hypotheses associated with your argument, and a bibliography. If you can also include the section that develops your argument, all the better.
- By April 22, hand in draft of the section that develops your argument and derives hypotheses, the description of your research design, and preliminary hypothesis tests.
- By May 13, hand in your final paper.

Readings: Required readings are listed first, then recommended readings for each week. An extended list of suggested readings appears at the end of the syllabus. We will read significant portions of the following books. Other required readings will be uploaded to the course Canvas site or are readily accessible online.

Some books may be available online free of charge through the UT Library website due to the pandemic.

- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0-521-81452-9.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0-521-58527-9
- Greene, Kenneth F. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0-521-877190.
- Hinich, Melvin, and Michael Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.ISBN: 0-521-56567-7
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN: 0-8014-8320-4
- Riedl, Rachel Beatty. 2014. *Institutions in New Democracies: African Political Party System Development and Endurance*. ISBN: 9781107045040. Not yet published – should be available in Feb.
- Roberts, Kenneth. 2015. *Changing Course in Latin America Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521673266.
- Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism.* New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9781107660397.

Course outline by week

1. Introduction

Part I. Party Origins

2. Social cleavages
3. Internally and externally mobilized parties

Part II. Party competition and voting behavior

4. Spatial competition
5. Electoral rules and other institutions
6. Clientelism
7. Mass partisanship

Part III. Party development and change

8. Party organization and activism
9. Party system institutionalization
10. Party system change

Part IV. Special types of parties and party systems

1. Ethnic parties
2. Dominant party systems
3. Parties in authoritarian regimes

Part V. Research papers

4. Student presentations
5. Student presentations

Week 1. Introduction and Overview (January 21)

Themes

- What is a party? How do parties differ from social movements and interest groups?
- What purposes/functions do parties serve? What characteristics of parties should interest us?
- What is a party system? What characteristics of party systems should interest us?
- To what extent are theories developed to understand the U.S. and West European partes and party systems useful for analyzing those in new democracies, hybrid, and authoritarian regimes?

Readings

Ware, Alan. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 1-13.

Kitschelt, Herbert "Party Systems" in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 522-554.

Lupu, Noam "Political Parties and Party Systems," in *The Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions*, Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino (eds.), London: Routledge, pp 128-144.

Week 2. Social Cleavages (January 28)

Themes

- Parties are often based on grievances/demands. Where do those come from? What constitutes a social cleavage?
- Why are some *social* cleavages transformed into *political* cleavages, but others are not? Are intermediate organizations necessary to make this happen? Can politicians construct political cleavages absent social cleavages?
- How does the sociological theory of parties account for party origins and party system change?
- Can party systems stabilize if they aren't based on social cleavages?
- What types of social and political cleavages exist in the countries you know? Do they differ from the class, religion, and regional cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) highlighted in their original argument about Western European party systems?

Readings

Kalyvas, Stathis. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Emphasis on Introduction, Chs. Introduction, 1-2, 5, and Conclusion. Also, at least scan Ch. 3. [How the religious cleavage yielded parties in some countries but not in others]

Chhibber, Pradeep and Mariano Torcal "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in New Democracies: Spain" *Comparative Political Studies* 30, 1 (1997): 27-54. [Politicians can politicize social cleavages]

Recommended

Lispet, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" in P. Mair (ed.) *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. [The original. Parties represent the religious, class, or regional cleavages inherited from deep social divides]

Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. [How social cleavages structured W European patrty systems.]

Chhibber, Pradeep, *Democracy without Associations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. [The paradoxical projection of social cleavages into the party system without civic support organizations.]

Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier (1991) *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [How the class cleavage yielded labor movements that were incorporated into centrist governing parties or outsider leftist parties, yielding stable party systems and democracy or instability and military rule.]

Week 3. Internally and externally mobilized parties (February 4)

Themes

- How are internally and externally generated parties? How do they differ in terms of party origins, organization, and strategy for inter-party competition?
- Do internally and/or externally generated parties rely on social cleavages?
- Do party origins influence their long-term development or do legacies fade?
- What can internally and externally mobilized types tell us about parties in democracies and non-democracies?

Readings

Aldrich, John. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 3-61. [In democracies, parties can emerge from within legislatures. Then election-seeking candidates rule.]

Shefter, Martin. 1977. "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy" *Politics & Society* 7(4): 403-51. [In outsider parties, ideologues rule.]

Lebas, Adrienne. 2011. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 2. [Groups associated with social interests build parties from the bottom-up.]

Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. "Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success" *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 347- 59. [Existing parties can help or hinder new party development. For more, see Hug and recommended spatial theory readings]

Recommended

Hug, Simon. *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001, pp. 37-64; recommended pp. 79-123.

Hanson, Stephen. 2006. "Postimperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia." *East European Politics and Societies* 20(2):343-372.

Cox, Gary. 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 4. Spatial Competition (February 11)

Themes

- How do parties compete with each other? The most coherent model comes from Anthony Downs's 1957 *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* How does that model work? What assumptions about parties (what they want to maximize), about intra-party politics (the preferences of candidates/leaders/activists), and about voter behavior are necessary to generate the median voter theorem (MVT)?
- Is representation of the median voter and the normative conception of democracy it implies desirable?
- How do predictions regarding the MVT/the direction of competition change if we alter a) the number of competing parties, b) the number of dimensions of competition, or c) voters' decision functions (for instance by adding valence issues, PID or vote buying)?
- How do the dynamics of inter-party competition influence the representation of social cleavages and new party entry in one- and two-dimensional competition?

Readings

Hinich, Melvin, and Michael Munger, *Analytical Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 1-72. [Goals are to understand 1) the logic of classical Downsian one-dimensional competition and the ingredients of the Median Voter Theorem (see first few pages of Robertson below and first few pages of Grofman in recommended readings as well) and 2) why equilibrium is illusive in multi-dimensional competition. You can set aside comments about Black and committee voting with small electorates. If you have time, read on probabilistic voting in Ch. 8.]

If you have a lot of trouble with the light formalization in the Hinich and Munger, you can get goal #1 above by reading Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Boston: Addison Wesley. Ch 1-3, 7-8. We can then go over Goal #2 in class.

Robertson, David. *A Theory of Party Competition*. New York: Wiley, 1976, pp. 23-54. [Some of the many possible ways to perturb the MVT even in one dimensional competition]

Sartori, Giovanni. "A Typology of Party Systems" in Peter Mair (ed.) *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp 316-350. [One-dimensional spatial competition can be moderating (as in the MVT) or polarizing in multiparty systems. For an expanded treatment, see Shesple and Cohen below.]

Recommended

Grofman, Bernard. 2004. "Downs and Two-Party Convergence" *Annual Review of Political Science.* 7:25–46. [A non-mathematical overview of the conditions necessary to generate centripetal competition in one dimension and the consequences of changing many of those conditions.]

Shepsle, Kenneth and Ronald Cohen. 1990. "Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections" in James Enelow and Melvin Hinich (eds.) *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 12-45. [A more mathematical view with predictions for new party entry. Compare to Meguid.]

Adams, James, Samuel Merrill III, and Bernard Grofman. *A Unified Theory of Party Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Chapters 1-4, 11.

Week 5. Electoral Institutions (February 25)

Themes

- Clearly, the number of parties and the direction of competition matter influence a host of outcomes of interest, but what causes those outcomes? Social cleavages offer one starting point. Institutions offer another. How do electoral institutions affect the number of parties? Do they determine the minimum number?
- Can institutional arguments account for the number of parties at the national level?
- Why do we care about the number of parties anyway?
- Compare the predictions regarding party system change in institutional, social cleavages, and spatial theories.
- What other institutions might matter beyond electoral district magnitude and government format?
- Two issues for discussion appear in the recommended readings and are thus optional: 1) How do institutions affect the direction of partisan competition (see Calvo and Hellwig), and 2) Are electoral institutions endogenous or exogenous to partisan competition (see Boix).

Readings

Cox, Gary (1997) *Making Votes Count*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-122, 181-202, remainder of the book recommended.

Samuels, David. 2002. "Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(4): 461-83. [Government format influences parties]

Recommended

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies" *The American Political Science Review* 93, 3: 609-624. [Institutions may structure behavior but politics structures institutions]

Calvo, Ernesto and Timothy Hellwig (2011) "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems" *American Journal of Political Science* 55, 1 (January): 27-41. [How electoral systems modify spatial incentives]

Moser, Robert G. 1998. "Electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states" *World Politics* 51. [Duverger's Law may not operate under all conditions.]

Carey, John and Mathew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas" *Electoral Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 417-439. [Some counting methods reinforce party cohesion whereas others undermine it.]

Week 6. Political Clientelism (March 4)

Themes

- So far, we have considered voters as rational agents that maximize their own welfare through programmatic representation (i.e., they vote for candidates that institute policy that will benefit them). What if voters accept direct benefits from candidates as they campaign for office?
- When parties seek to buy vote choices, what makes those attempt succeed or fail? Consider targeting, pricing, and compliance.
- When might parties instead seek to buy turnout, abstention, rally attendance, or simply use selective benefits as part of routine campaigning?
- Can vote buying be accommodated within the spatial model or does it imply wholly different dynamics of inter-party competition? If different, what does successful vote buying imply for issue representation, party organization and strategy?

Readings

Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco (2013) *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism.* New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-5. [Modern machine politics requires brokers but that introduces an intractable principal-agent problem]

Greene, Kenneth F. (2021) "Money Can't Buy You Love: Partisan Responses to Vote-Buying Offers in Modern Democracy" manuscript, University of Texas at Austin. [Voter responsiveness alters predictions about targeting and efficacy]

Muñoz, Paula (2014) "An Informational Theory of Campaign clientelism: The Case of Peru" *Comparative Politics* 47, 1: 79-98. [Benefits provision alters competition long before election day. Relate to Cox's Making Votes Count]

Recommended

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections" *American Journal of Political Science* 58, 2: 415–432. [Machines diversify across vote-choice, turnout, and abstention buying]

Hicken, Allen, and Noah Nathan. 2020. "Clientelism's Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics" *Annual Review of Political Science* 23:277–94. [Monitoring for voter compliance isn't as big a deal as the current poli sci lit claims]

Kramon, Eric. 2016. "Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying" *World Politics* 68, 3: 454-498. [Selective benefits can be part of routine campaigning to burnish candidates' images]

Zarazaga, Rodrigo. 2016. "Party Machines and Voter-Customized Rewards Strategies" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 28, 4: 678-701. [Brokers make VB work rather than make it fail as in Stokes et al.]

~~Week 7. Mass Partisanship~~ ~~()~~ [CANCELLED DUE TO ATTACK OF THE POLAR VORTEX – TEXAS EDITION]

~~Themes~~

- ~~Why would voters support parties when neither programmatic nor direct benefits are at stake? How does mass partisanship develop and how does it influence party systems if it does?~~
- ~~Is partisanship rational and thus compatible with the optimistic view of issue representation in spatial theory or is it rooted in cognitive psychology and thus allows parties to lead voters on the issues and/or violate mandates?~~
- ~~How can parties build mass partisanship?~~
- ~~Does partisanship (and its measurement) operate the same way in new and older democracies?~~

~~Readings~~

~~Green, Donald Philip, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2005. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters.* New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1-3. [An argument that PID in the U.S. is a social identity, not a rationalist running tally of preferences, thus creating significant stability in the party's electoral coalitions.]~~

Lupu, Noam. 2014. "Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America." *World Politics* 66 (4): 561–602. [Parties can erode PID by moving their issue positions, yielding instability and party breakdown.]

Greene, Kenneth F. 2011. "Campaign Persuasion and Nascent Partisanship in Mexico's New Democracy" *American Journal of Political Science* 55, 2 (April): 398–416. [PID as measured in surveys may not function that way it does in long established democracies, implying that "brand dilution" might be less consequential in some party systems.]

Recommended

Svolik, Milan and Matthew Graham. 2020. "Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States" *American Political Science Review* 114 (2): 392-409. [PID can be incredibly powerful, overcoming even sacred norms of democracy]

Lodge, Milton, and Charles Taber. 2013. *The Rationalizing Voter*. New York: Cambridge University Press. [PID can generate motivated reasoning and significant partisan bias in new information acquisition.]

Converse, Philip E. 1969. "Of Time and Partisan Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (2): 139-71. [An optimistic view of the "natural" development of PID as a stabilizing force in new democracies]

Johnston, Richard. 2006. "Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 329–51. [An overview of arguments about the concept and implications of PID in the advanced democracies.]

Week 8 Party Organization and Activism (March 11)

Themes

- In Downs, the MVT requires a party dictator or that all members' have the same preference schedule. What happens to party strategy if parties are factionalized by ideology or by role (candidate, activist, rank-and-file)?
- How do institutions such as federalism and presidentialism vs. parliamentarism influence party organization?
- Under what conditions do parties rely on activist labor vs. donor finance to communicate with voters?
- Can we derive party types (often called families) from how they compensate their activists, brokers, or donors?
- Competing requires resources that comes from activists and/or donors. How those contributors are managed through party organization (e.g., internal democracy or dictatorship), influences party strategy.

- Recall Stokes et al. on the organization of modern political machines.

Readings

Kitschelt, Herbert *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Ch 1, pp. 198-201, and Ch. 5. [Social cleavages determine the balance of activist types that either push parties toward or away from the optimal positioning strategy.]

Levitsky, Steven "Organization and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective" *World Politics* 54, 1 (October): 2001: 27-56. [Low party institutionalization is akin to having a party dictator, capable of sidelining ideological activists and shifting the party's issue positions. See Lupu in Week 10 on the costs.]

Recommended

Stokes, Susan. 1999. "Political Parties and Democracy" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 243-267. [Reviews several models of intra-party organization, mostly from the formal literature]

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1989. "The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited." Political Studies 37 (3):400-421. [Kitschelt generalizes the reasoning behind May's "Law of curv disp" which argues that candidates/party leaders want to win votes and thus cater to the MV (if the MV rules) whereas activists are ideological.]

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Party organization is sticky, glued to party origins.]

Mair, Peter, ed. 1990. *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [The first several selections by Weber; Duverger; Neumann; Kirchheimer; Pizzorno are classics of W European party organization taxonomies.]

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1: 5-28. [Governing parties collude to use state resources, relying less on activist labor or private donors.]

Week 9. Party System Institutionalization (March 25)

Themes

- What is party system institutionalization (PSI)?
- How does PSI affect outcomes of interest such as political representation, inter-party competition, social choice, and regime stability?
- Why do some new democracies suffer from low PSI whereas others seem to have generated high PSI?

Readings

Riedl, Rachel Beatty. *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa. 2014.* Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

Mainwaring, Scott. 2018. *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Update and revision to the text that focused attention on PSI]

Powell, Eleanor, and Josh Tucker. (2014). "Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries: New Data, New Results and New Approaches." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 123-147. [A measurement innovation to decompose volatility (the key ingredient in PSI) into party entry/exit and voter shifts.]

Week 10. Party System Change (April 1)

Themes

- How do realignments come about and who/what causes them?
- Is cleavage change exogenous or endogenous to political competition?
- Can strategic politician manipulate cleavages during periods of change or are the new party alignments structurally predetermined?

Readings

Roberts, Kenneth. 2015. *Changing Course in Latin America Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era*. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Compare to Lupu's argument in Week 8]

Recommended

Morgan, Jana. 2011. *Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse*. University Park PA: Pennsylvania University Press. [an alternative to Roberts. Also see Lupu in World Politics].

Sundquist, James. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of the Parties in the United States*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983, pp. 1-49. Recommend pp. 298-321.

Aldrich, John. 2011. *Why Parties?: A Second Look*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Candidates rule so they change parties.]

Schlozman, Daniel. 2015. *When Movements Anchor Parties*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Social movements influence parties so change is from the bottom up]

Week 11. Ethnic Parties (April 8)

Themes

- In light of what we know from social cleavages, institutions, and spatial theory, under what conditions can ethnic parties form?
- Who votes for ethnic parties?
- Would our answer to the prior questions change if we adopted a primordialist or constructivist view of ethnicity?
- In what circumstances does Chandra's or Madrid's argument make the most sense?

Readings

Chandra, Kanchan. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, Chapters 1-5 and 8-11.

Madrid, Raul "The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America" *World Politics* 60, 3 (April) 2008: 475-508.

Recommended

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London, UK: Verso, 1983.

Bates, Robert. "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* (January 1974): 457-483.

Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Laitin, David. *Hegemony and Culture*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Lijphart, Arend. 1980. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ordeshook, Peter, and Olga Shvetsova. "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (February 1994): 100-123.

Posner, Daniel. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth Shepsle. *Politics in Plural Societies.* Columbus: Charles E Merrill, 1972, pp. 23-105.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wilkinson, Steve. *Votes and Violence Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Week 12. Dominant Party Systems (April 15)

Themes

- What is a dominant party system in relation to a fully competitive democracy and single-party regimes?
- How do parties maintain dominance once established?
- How do opposition parties form and grow in these systems?
- Can we make generalizations across dominant party systems or do social cleavages and institutional features better account for the variance?

Readings

Greene, Kenneth F. (2007) *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press. [you can skim/skip chs. 7-8 if you are pressed for time]

Recommended

Magaloni, Beatriz. *Voting for Autocracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Magaloni, Beatriz and Ruth Kricheli (2010) "Political Order and One-Party Rule" *Annual Review Of Political Science* 13, pp. 123-143.

Scheiner, Ethan. *Democracy without Competition: Opposition Failure in One-Party Dominant Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Smith, Benjamin, "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule," *World Politics* 57:3 (Spring 2005), pp. 421-451.

Week 13. Parties in Authoritarian Regimes (April 22)

Themes

- Why form parties in authoritarian regimes? What functions do they fulfill?
- When do parties help consolidate authoritarian rule or undermine it?

Readings

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5 and 6.

Recommended

Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gandhi, Jennider. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Meng, Anne. 2018. *Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week 14. Student presentations (April 29)

Week 15. Student presentations (May 6)