Supporting information (SI) for "The 'weight' of territorial issues: Evidence from Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland"

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Part A: Conjoint design and key question wording

Figure A1. Experimental Design: Example from the Scotland survey

Below you will find the descriptions of two candidates and their positions on some issues.

	CANDIDATE A: 55-year old Candidate Ms NF	CANDIDATE B: 45-year old Candidate Ms RL
Environmental regulations	keep the *current level* of environmental regulations in the region	*fewer environmental regulations* to help businesses and make things you buy less expensive
Political power of the EU	keep the EU's *current level* of political power	*reduce the political power of the EU* so that more decisions are taken by member states, and fewer at the European level
Public spending	*more spending* on public policies like health, education or unemployment insurance, even if this means higher taxes	*less spending* on public policies like health, education or unemployment insurance, so that taxes can be lowered
Scottish independence	*is against* Scottish independence	does not have a clear stance on Scottish independence
Immigration	*reduce the number of immigrants* into Scotland	allow *more immigrants* into Scotland

A1. Candidate-choice wording:

The below text indicates candidate issue-position wording [Scottish sample]:

- [25/35/45/55/65]-year old Candidate [Mr/Ms] [2 random-letter combination] supports the policies listed below on the left, and [25/35/45/55/65]-year old Candidate [Mr/Ms] [2 random letter-combination] supports the policies on the right.
- The policy options each candidate could take were the following, randomly selected options separated by the "/":
- allow *more immigrants* into Scotland / keep *current number of immigrants* into Scotland / *reduce the number of immigrants* into Scotland
- *more spending* on public policies like health, education or unemployment insurance, even if this means higher taxes / keep *current levels* on public policies spending like health, education or unemployment insurance / *less spending* on public policies like health, education or unemployment insurance, so that taxes can be lowered
- *more environmental regulations* in the region, even if this damages certain businesses and makes things you buy more expensive / keep the *current level* of environmental regulations in the region / *fewer environmental regulations* to help businesses and make things you buy less expensive
- *increase the political power of the EU* so that more political decisions are taken at the European level, and fewer by member states / keep the EU's *current level of political power* / *reduce* the *political power of the EU* so that more decisions are taken by member states, and fewer at the European level
- supports Scottish independence / does not have a clear stance on Scottish independence / is against Scottish independence

A2. Policy preference wording

The wording of the territorial question for respondents in Scotland was, “Which of the following best characterizes your overall preference for the future of Scotland’s legal status?” The response options were: “I would like Scotland to be an independent country” / “I would like Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom, but with greater autonomy” / “I would like Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom as it is now” / “I would like Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom and have less autonomy.”[1]

[1] Similar wording was employed for Catalonia and support for united Ireland or not in Northern Ireland.

Part B. Demographic variables coding and descriptive statistics

We measure and code key demographic variables as follows:

For all three regions, we measure female gender as 1 and 0 otherwise. Age is recoded in three categories (18-34, 35-54, 55+). We measure education in three categories (fewer than 5 years and compulsory secondary schooling as 0, advanced secondary and any vocational training as 1, any university and above as 2). Household income is coded on a 1-14 scale for all three regions, where respondent chooses a relevant income interval.

Descriptive statistics

Table B1: Descriptive statistics. Catalonia sample

Variable	%	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	51%				
Age		46	15.51	18	91
Compulsory secondary education	5.5%				
Advanced secondary education	34.9%				
Graduate education	59.6%				
Income category (1-14)		9.5	2.7	1	14
Independence	43.7%				
More Autonomy	35.8%				
Status Quo	14.5%				
Less Autonomy	6%				

Sample size: 1,683

Table B2: Descriptive statistics. Scotland sample

Variable	%	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	52%				
Age		47	15.95	18	88
Compulsory secondary education	21%				
Advanced secondary education	40%				
Graduate education	39%				
Income category (1-14)		7.8	3.4	1	14
Independence	44.7%				
More Autonomy	27.6%				
Status Quo	19.1%				
Less Autonomy	8.5%				


Sample size: 1,650

Table B3: Descriptive Statistics. Northern Ireland sample

Variable	%	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	53.8%				
Age		45	15.4	18	83
Compulsory secondary education	29.9%				
Advanced secondary education	30.1%				
Graduate education	39.9%				
Income category (1-14)		7.6	3.3	1	14
Protestant	43.5%				
No or other religion	27%				
Catholic	29.5%				
United Ireland	22.7%				
More Autonomy	29.1%				
Status Quo	39.6%				
Less Autonomy	8.5%				


Sample size: 796

Figure B1: Catalonia: Support for independence (1990-2021)




Note: This figure shows average support for independence measuring territorial preferences in a binary way: 1 is for respondents who support a Catalan independent state, 0 is for respondents who do not support independence. The latter can have diverse preferences (such as Catalonia being a state in a federal state, being a region in a decentralized state, or having no autonomy whatsoever). The data comes *from Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials* (ICPS).

Figure B2: Scotland: Average support for independence (1999-2020)



Note: This figure shows average support for independence measuring territorial preferences in a binary way: 1 is for respondents who support a Scottish independent state, 0 is for respondents who do not support independence (the latter can have diverse preferences such as Scotland having more autonomy within the UK, or keeping the territorial status quo). Data comes from The Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) annual survey. The authors could not access the raw data from the 2015-2020 surveys so 95% CIs cannot be estimated for this period.

Figure B3: Northern Ireland: Preferences for united Ireland (1998-2020)



Note: This figure shows average support for united Ireland measuring territorial preferences in a binary way: 1 is for respondents who support a united Ireland, 0 is for respondents who do not support it (the latter can have diverse territorial preferences). Data comes from Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey. Data from the year 2011 is missing.

Figure B4: Spending preferences in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Ireland




Figure B5: Immigration preferences in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Ireland




Figure B6: Environmental policies preferences in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Ireland





Figure B7: Degree of EU power preferences in Catalonia, Scotland and Northern Ireland



Part C. Average effects

Figures C1-C3 show the AMCEs and marginal means for each issue position for Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In all three regions, the issue that generates the largest impact is social spending, in particular the rejection of a candidate who would reduce spending and the reward of a candidate who would increase spending. This result is consistent with the literature that stresses the primacy of the left-right cleavage. From these average results, we observe that territory is less important than spending and comparable to other issues. In Catalonia, for example, candidates who want to reduce environment regulations are punished as much as those who are anti-independence, and being pro-independence gives a candidate no advantage electorally (while being pro-environmental regulations does). In Scotland, candidates allowing more immigration and willing to give more powers to the EU are both punished as much as those opposing independence. As in Catalonia, being a pro-independence candidate brings no reward, relative to the baseline territorial position (i.e., ambiguity in the territorial position). In Northern Ireland, being pro-united Ireland is not punished significantly more than giving powers to the EU or supporting increased immigration.

Figure C1. AMCE and Marginal Means for issue positions, Catalonia




Figure C2. AMCE and Marginal Means for issue positions, Scotland





Figure C3: AMCE and Marginal Means for issue positions, Northern Ireland



Part D: Regression tables

Table D1: Candidate choice

	CATALONIA b/se	SCOTLAND b/se	NORTHERN IRELAND b/se
C Female	-0.008	0.009	0.017
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
C 35-yr	-0.004	0.001	0.015
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 45-yr	-0.025	-0.003	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 55-yr	-0.018	-0.016	-0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 65-yr	-0.023	-0.010	-0.022
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro immig	-0.057***	-0.075***	-0.058***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
C anti immig	-0.025*	-0.041***	-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro spend	0.078***	0.040***	0.060***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti spend	-0.145***	-0.109***	-0.102***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro envregs	0.030**	-0.028**	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
C anti envregs	-0.097***	-0.049***	-0.009
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
C pro EU	-0.029*	-0.071***	-0.052***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti EU	-0.026*	0.025**	-0.013
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro indep/UIR	0.011	-0.007	-0.065***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti indep/UIR	-0.092***	-0.052***	0.076***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
(R)espondent characteristics			
R female	0.000	-0.004**	-0.006**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R 35-54 yr	-0.006*	-0.009***	-0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R 55+ yr	-0.007*	-0.010***	-0.008**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R advanced secondary ed	0.005	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R graduate	0.007	0.002	-0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R income	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.640***	0.635***	0.593***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	13110	16500	7960
R2	0.057	0.030	0.036

Baseline for pro- and anti-independence in respondents in Catalonia and Scotland is "More Autonomy". Baseline for pro-united Ireland in respondents in Northern Ireland is "Status Quo", i.e., anti-united Ireland.
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D2: Candidate choice by respondent's territorial preference

	CATALONIA		SCOTLAND		NORTHERN IRELAND	
	(1) Prefer ind b/se	(2) Don't prefer ind b/se	(1) Prefer ind b/se	(2) Don't prefer ind b/se	(1) Prefer utd Ire b/se	(2) Don't prefer utd Ire b/se
C Female	-0.005	-0.002	0.004	0.006	0.015	0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
C 35-yr	-0.004	-0.009	0.011	0.002	0.030	0.008
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
C 45-yr	-0.016	-0.029	-0.006	0.008	-0.031	0.015
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
C 55-yr	0.001	-0.024	-0.005	-0.020	0.018	-0.028
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
C 65-yr	-0.013	-0.026	-0.000	-0.010	-0.021	-0.019
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
C pro immig	-0.005	-0.093***	-0.042**	-0.093***	-0.048	-0.065***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C anti immig	-0.048**	-0.010	-0.065***	-0.017	-0.062	0.011
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C pro spend	0.068***	0.085***	0.037**	0.045***	0.117***	0.038*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C anti spend	-0.133***	-0.154***	-0.124***	-0.093***	-0.054	-0.113***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C pro envregs	0.046**	0.018	-0.003	-0.041**	0.015	-0.016
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C anti envregs	-0.100***	-0.091***	-0.075***	-0.032*	-0.037	0.000
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C pro EU	-0.024	-0.027	-0.075***	-0.069***	-0.001	-0.067***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C anti EU	-0.021	-0.028*	-0.032*	0.069***	-0.056	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C pro indep/UIR	0.230***	-0.158***	0.210***	-0.173***	0.215***	-0.161***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C anti indep/UIR	-0.242***	0.025	-0.203***	0.073***	-0.068	0.126***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)
<u>(R)espondent characteristics</u>						
R female	-0.005	0.002	-0.010*	0.006	-0.010	-0.006
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
R 35-54 yr	-0.010	-0.001	-0.035***	0.004	-0.019*	-0.001
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
R 55+ yr	-0.013	-0.001	-0.035***	0.005	-0.003	-0.012*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
R advanced secondary ed	-0.004	0.011	-0.004	0.001	0.007	-0.004
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
R graduate	0.005	0.012	-0.004	0.001	-0.002	-0.007

	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
R income	-0.000	-0.000	0.001*	0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.606***	0.660***	0.657***	0.598***	0.486***	0.630***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Observations	5700	7410	7380	9120	1810	6150
R2	0.193	0.087	0.139	0.075	0.104	0.077

Baseline for pro- and anti-independence in respondents in Catalonia and Scotland is "More Autonomy". Baseline for pro-united Ireland in respondents in Northern Ireland is "Status Quo", i.e., anti-united Ireland.
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D3. Treatment effects for candidate issue positions, by all respondent issue preferences

	CATALONIA Choosing candidate b/se	SCOTLAND Choosing candidate b/se	NORTHERN IRELAND Choosing candidate b/se
C Female	-0.003	0.005	0.020
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
C 35-yr	-0.005	0.004	0.015
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 45-yr	-0.021	0.001	-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 55-yr	-0.015	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C 65-yr	-0.021	-0.007	-0.019
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R pro immig	-0.060***	-0.021	-0.008
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
R anti immig	-0.031*	0.001	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro immig	-0.062***	-0.058***	-0.042*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti immig	-0.090***	-0.075***	-0.043*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R pro imm x C pro imm	0.162***	0.112***	0.080
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
R pro imm x C anti imm	0.007	-0.051*	-0.092*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
R anti imm x C pro imm	-0.091***	-0.137***	-0.099**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R anti imm x C anti imm	0.183***	0.144***	0.168***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R pro spend	-0.006	0.004	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R anti spend	-0.032	-0.020	0.027
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
C pro spend	0.019	0.004	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti spend	-0.108***	-0.064***	-0.052*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R pro spend x C pro spend	0.085***	0.073***	0.117***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R pro spend x C anti spend	-0.068**	-0.084***	-0.070*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R anti spend x C pro spend	-0.066	-0.037	-0.078
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)
R anti spend x C anti spend	0.140**	0.054	-0.032
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
R pro env	-0.009	-0.024*	-0.016
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R anti env	-0.011	-0.010	0.029
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
C pro env	-0.063**	-0.071***	-0.032

	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti env	-0.033	-0.045**	0.019
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R pro env x C pro env	0.120***	0.125***	0.100***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R pro env x C anti env	-0.090***	-0.035	-0.073*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R anti env x C pro env	-0.069	-0.032	-0.074
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R anti env x C anti env	0.101	0.078**	0.001
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R pro EU	-0.038**	0.001	-0.041
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R anti EU	-0.035*	-0.027*	-0.068***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro EU	-0.063***	-0.050***	-0.070**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C anti EU	-0.039**	-0.040**	-0.082***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R pro EU x C pro EU	0.126***	0.052	0.131**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
R pro EU x C anti EU	-0.033	-0.052	-0.003
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
R anti EU x C pro EU	-0.022	-0.067***	0.002
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R anti EU x C anti EU	0.097***	0.147***	0.173***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R pro ind/UIR	-0.058***	-0.020	-0.025
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R anti ind	-0.060***	-0.004	-0.125***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
C pro ind/UIR	-0.124***	-0.109***	-0.172***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
C anti ind/UIR	-0.064***	0.014	0.055
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R pro ind/UIR x C pro ind/UIR	0.351***	0.315***	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
R pro ind/UIR x C anti ind/UIR	-0.179***	-0.215***	0.111**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
R anti ind x C pro ind	-0.101***	-0.106***	0.388***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R anti ind x C anti ind	0.246***	0.128***	-0.135**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
<u>Respondent characteristics</u>			
Gender: female	-0.002	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age: 35-54	-0.004	-0.013***	0.001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
55+	-0.007	-0.017***	-0.010
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education: advanced	0.003	0.004	-0.002
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
graduate	0.008	0.001	-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Constant	0.734***	0.666***	0.672***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	13110	16500	7960
R2	0.181	0.142	0.118

Baseline for pro- and anti-independence in respondents in Catalonia and Scotland is “More Autonomy”. Baseline for pro- united Ireland in respondents in Northern Ireland is “Status Quo”, i.e., anti- united Ireland.
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by respondent.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Part E: Candidate choice by binary territorial preferences (Catalonia, Scotland, and NI)

We present predicted candidate choice based on individual territorial preferences, using a binary measurement of preferences, simply distinguishing between individuals who oppose or support independence. Results are based on models displayed in Table C2 except with binary coding of territorial preference.

Figure E1: Results by policy preference with binary territorial preferences, Catalonia




Figure E2: Results by policy preference with binary territorial preferences, Scotland





Figure E3: Results by policy preference with binary territorial preferences, Northern Ireland



Part F: Omnibus F-tests and predicted change in candidate choice probability


This section presents the omnibus F-tests and differences in probabilities of candidate vote choice. For each of the figures we plot the marginal probabilities in candidate choice, based on the regression tables of Part C3 of the SI. "C" refers to the candidate position, "R" refers to respondent. "I" refers to a pro-independence position of a respondent in Catalonia or Scotland. "Auto R" refers to a respondent who supports more autonomy. Thus, the quantity "Pro I – Auto Rs" is the difference in candidate selection probability for pro-independence respondents versus pro-autonomy respondents, with respect to a specific candidate.

Catalonia

Table F1. Result of omnibus F-test:

	df	F	P>F
C pro-ind | R			
R pro-ind	2	464.37	0.0000
R more autonomy	2	22.00	0.0000
R SQ or less auto	2	146.31	0.0000
Joint	6	211.62	0.0000
Denominator	1310		

Figure F1: Differences in probability of candidate choice by different respondent preferences & candidate positions, Catalonia




Scotland

Table F2. Result of omnibus F-test:

	df	F	P>F
C pro-ind | R			
R pro-ind	2	361.20	0.0000
R more autonomy	2	23.47	0.0000
R SQ or less auto	2	183.74	0.0000
Joint	6	190.08	0.0000
Denominator	1649		

Figure F2: Differences in probability of candidate choice by different respondent preferences & candidate positions, Scotland




Northern Ireland

Table F3. Result of omnibus F-test:


	df	F	P>F
C pro UIR | R			
R anti-UIR	2	95.94	0.0000
R pro-UIR	2	46.09	0.0000
Joint	4	76.25	0.0000
Denominator	795		

Figure F3: Differences in probability of candidate choice by different respondent preferences & candidate positions, Northern Ireland



G. Additional graphs of predicted probability of candidate selection

Figure G1: Predicted probability of candidate selection by pro-autonomy and pro-spending respondent where candidate is ambiguous, Catalonia, Scotland, and NI



Note: the order of the candidates is 1. Incongruent with the respondent on both issues, 2. Incongruent on territorial preferences & congruent on spending, 3. Congruent on territorial preferences but incongruent on spending, 4. Congruent with the respondent on both issues