Ideology and Revolution in Civil Wars: The "Marxist Paradox"

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Supplementary Material (SM)

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List of Acronyms

ANC African National Congress

BLA Balochistan Liberation Army

CPI-M Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

EAM *Ethnikó Apeleftherotikó Métopo* - National Liberation Front

EDES *Ethnikós Dimokratikós Ellinikós Sýndesmos* - National Republican Greek League

ELF Eritrean Liberation Front

ELN *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* - National Liberation Army

EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation Front

FARC *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* - Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FRELIMO *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* - Mozambique Liberation Front

FRETILIN *Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente* - Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor

GDP Gross domestic product

HTS Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MNL Marxist National Liberation

MPLA *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* - People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NPA New People's Army

NRA/M National Resistance Army/Movement (Uganda)

PAC Pan Africanist Congress

PKK *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* - Kurdistan Workers' Party

RS Revolutionary Socialist

SL *Sendero Luminoso* - Shining Path

SNC Symmetric non-conventional

SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army

SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization

TPLF Tigray People's Liberation Front

TR Technology of Rebellion

UN United Nations

UNITA *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

USARF University Students' African Revolutionary Front

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWII World War II or Second World War

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union

Section A. Data

I. Updated Dataset

Our civil wars dataset is based on Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) with some minor modifications corresponding to the period 1944-2004, which are listed in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). We have not made any modifications to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl's (2019) list from 2004 onwards. We have added a few cases to the 1944-2004 period, which are cases that Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl added to the original Sambanis civil war list. Overall, we have added a total of 28 cases to the Kalyvas and Balcells's 2010 dataset (listed in Table A.1).

Table A.1. New cases

Country	yrst	most	yrend	moend	conflict
Burundi	2015	5			Coup and Post-Coup Unrest (FOREBU, RED-Tabara)
CAR	2013	3			(Ex-)Seleka vs. Antibalaka
Cameroon	2014	3			Boko Haram
Chad	2005	12	2010	9	FUC, RAFD, UFDD, ANCD
Ivory Coast	2011	2	2011	5	Gbagbo and militias vs. Ouattara and FRCI, FN
Egypt	2013	7			Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, IS-Sinai)
Ethiopia	1998				Ogaden
Ethiopia	1999		2002		Oromo
Georgia	2008	8	2008	8	South Ossetia
Iraq	2013	4			ISIS/IS
Libya	2011	2	2011	10	Anti-Qadhafi, NTC
Libya	2012				Post-Qadhafi Factional Fighting (GNC, LNA, IS, GNA, Militias)
Mali	2012	1			MNLA, AQIM, Ansar al-Dine, MUJAO; Tuareg + Islamist
Myanmar/Burma	2011				Ethnic Groups in Kachin, Shan, Rakhine (KIA, TNLA, MNDAA, ABSDF, AA, ARSA)
Nigeria	2009	7			Boko Haram
Pakistan	2006				Baluchistan insurgency
Pakistan	2006				Pakistani Taliban (NWFP, FATA)
Somalia	2006	6	2006	12	ICU vs. Ethiopia and TFG
Somalia	2007	1			TFG vs. al-Shabaab, Ras Kamboni, Hizbul Islam, IS
South Sudan	2013	12			Ethno-Factional Fighting (Kiir vs. Machar + Tribal Clashes)
Sudan	2011	7	2016	6	SPLM/A-North, SRF, SSDM/A, SSLM/A
Syria	1979	6	1982	2	Muslim Brotherhood
Syria	2011	3			FSA, Jebhat al-Nusra
Syria	2013	4			ISIS/IS
Turkey	2005		2013	3	PKK (Kurds)
Turkey	2015	7			PKK, TAK (Kurds)
Ukraine	2014	4			Novorossiya (Donetsk and Luhansk)
Yemen	2004	6	2014	9	Houthis, AQAP, Yemeni Revolution
Yemen	2014	9			Houthis and Saleh vs. Hadi and STC and Saudi Coalition vs. AQAP and IS-Yemen
Congo-Zaire	2012	5	2013	11	M23
Congo-Zaire	2016	8			Kamuina Nsapu

II. Codebook

Type of Rebel (*Warcat*)
It refers to the ideology of the main rebel organization. It is operationalized as a categorical variable with four levels:

- *Revolutionary Socialist rebels* (1): coded if the main rebel group professed a Marxist ideology at the outset of the war (i.e., when they produced political manifestos or made public declarations that had references to Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, or to a Socialist revolution).
- *Secessionist rebels* (2): the main rebel group professed a secessionist agenda.
- *Marxist National Liberation Movements (MNL) rebels* (3): the main rebel group professed a Marxist ideology and a secessionist agenda, coded as the intersection of the previous two variables.
- *Others* (4): the main rebel organization is non-secessionist and non-Marxist.

RS Rebels (*RSMNLdummy*)
Binary indicator with value 1 if *Warcat* is 1 or 3, and 0 if *Warcat* is 2 or 4.

RS including progressive groups (*RSprogr*)
A binary variable like RS rebels, but using a broader coding for RS, which includes "progressive" groups. These were groups that claimed to be Socialist Revolutionary but were not convincing (Roessler and Verhoeven, 2017). The cases that we include in this category are, in addition to all the cases coded as RS, RWA3 (RPF; genocide), SUD2 (SPLM, SPLA, NDA, AnyanyaII), ZAI5 (RCD, etc.).

Technology of Rebellion (*Technologyrebellion*)
Defined in Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) as the joint military technologies of states and rebels involved in armed conflicts. It is operationalized as a categorical variable with three potential values:

- *Conventional civil war* (1): the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a high level (heavy weaponry).
- *Irregular civil war* (2): the military technologies of the rebels lag vis-à-vis those of the state.
- *Symmetric non-conventional* (SNC) civil war (3): the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a low level (light weaponry).

For coding procedures of this variable, see Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)'s online appendix. We follow the same coding protocol for the additional cases in the dataset.

Outcome of the war (*BKoutcome*)
Following Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Kalyvas and Balcells (2014), this variable coded from the incumbent's viewpoint. It is operationalized as a categorical variable with three levels:

- *Incumbent Lost* (0): A situation in which the incumbent unilaterally concedes to all, or nearly all, insurgent demands, including the granting of independence (in secessionist wars) or the deposition of current leaders. We also refer to this outcome as *Rebel Victory*.
- *Draw* (1): A draw occurs when an incumbent is forced to concede to some, but not all, insurgent demands, and neither side obtains its maximal aims.
- *Incumbent Win* (2): A win occurs when the insurgency is militarily defeated and its organization destroyed, or the war ends without any political concessions granted to insurgent forces.

For coding procedures of this variable, see Balcells and Kalyas (2014)'s online appendix. We follow the same coding protocol for the additional cases in the dataset.

Government External Support (*GvtExtSupp*) and Rebel External Support (*RebelExtSupp*)
Following the coding in Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), this categorical variable classifies the level of external support received by the Government and the rebels during the war. It takes 4 possible values:

- No support (0)
- Low Support (1)
- Medium Support (2)
- High Support (3)

Rebex is a dummy created from *RebelExtSupp* with value 0 if *RebelExtSupp* equals 0 or 1, and value 1 if RebelExtSupp equals 2 or 3.

Gvtex is a dummy created from *GvtExtSupp* with value 0 if *GvtExtSupp* equals 0 or 1, and value 1 if *GvtExtSupp* equals 2 or 3.

For coding procedures, see Balcells and Kalyas (2014)'s online appendix. We follow the same coding protocol for the additional cases in the dataset.

GDP per capita (*Gdp_imp*) and Population (*Pop_mad_imp*):
Data on GDP per capita (in constant 2011$) and population (in thousands) come from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020) that compiles historical data for these variables for 169 countries between 1250 and 2018. Both variables are continuous. In terms of our sample, the Maddison project database does not include information for the Yemen Arab Republic (Yemen AR), the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen PR), Somalia, South Sudan and Papua New Guinea, and also, there are several missing values for some country-year observations.

We impute data for Papua New Guinea using the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). For the GDP per capita, we begin to impute the GDP per capita at current prices[1] for the year 2011. Then, we create a complete series up to 1960 applying to that year the real growth rates of the GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US$) that also comes from the WDI[2]. For the population of Papua New Guinea, we also use WDI data from 1960 to 2019.[3]

The Maddison Project database does not present data for Somalia, which is also missing in other important databases, such as the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) or the latest version of the World Penn Table (9.1) by Feenstra et al (2015). Our strategy here was to use data on GDP per capita at current prices for 2011 and 2010 from The Economic Statistics Branch of the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) and its National Accounts Main Aggregates database.[4] To the 2011 and 2010 GDP, we apply the growth rates of real GDP per capita from Penn's Table 7.1 (Heston et al, 2012), which is the latest version of PWT with data for Somalia, creating a series from 1970 to 2011.

[1] The identifier of the series is: NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
[2] The identifier of that series is: NY.GDP.PCAP.KD
[3] The identifier of that series is: SP.POP.TOTL
[4] http://data.un.org/Default.aspx

The case of Yemen is complex. Between 1967 and 1990, the current Republic of Yemen was divided into two countries: Yemen AR and Yemen PR. The Maddison project database only has data for the Republic of Yemen, but without distinguishing between Yemen AR and Yemen PR in the period 1967-1990. However, our dataset has observations for both countries and therefore we need to construct different series for them. The procedure was as follows: First, we imputed a proxy of its GDP per capita in 1990 using both the Maddison Project Database and data from Haber and Menaldo (2011). Haber and Menaldo (2011) have data on GDP per capita for the Republic of Yemen, Yemen AR and Yemen PR in constant 2000 dollars for 1990. Therefore, for that year, we can calculate what percentage of the GDP per capita of the Republic of Yemen are the GDP per capita of Yemen AR (103.7%) and Yemen PR (86.7%). Applying these percentages for the observation of the Republic of Yemen 1990 in the Maddison Project Database, we can impute an approximation of GDP per capita for Yemen AR and Yemen PR in constant 2011 US dollars. Then, to that approximation, we apply the growth rates of real GDP per capita for these countries from Haber and Menaldo (2011) to create series from 1970. Finally, we apply the growth rates of real GDP per capita from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to extend the series back to 1945. For the population of both countries we use a similar approach: using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003), we calculated for 1990 the percentage of the total population of the Republic of Yemen that corresponded to Yemen AR (81.8%) and Yemen PR (21.9%).[5] Applying those percentages to the 1990 observation for the Republic of Yemen in the Maddison Project, we impute the population of Yemen AR and Yemen PR in 1990. We then apply the population growth rates of Fearon and Laitin (1990) to create a series which begins in 1945.

Finally, for some country-years there were some missing observations. Two final procedures were used to maximize the number of non-missing observations. First, we used the growth rates of the GDP per capita and population from Fearon and Laitin (2003) to impute missing observations. Finally, for the remaining missing observations we imputed based on previous or posterior values using the following method: if in a country there is a missing observation for the GDP per capita (or population) in times t, we will impute that observation with the value of t+1 (if it exists and the observation in t-1 does not exist), t-1 (if it exists and the observation in t+1 does not exist), or the average of t-1 and t+1 (if both exist). We repeated this process for t-2 and t+2 for the remaining missing data. We did not apply this process for more years because the imputation would not be accurate enough.

We did not find data for South Sudan in constant 2011 US$.

Military Personnel (*Milper_imp*)
This variable comes from the National Material Capabilities dataset (v5.0) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972), which compiles data on military personnel (in thousands) from 1816 until 2012. It is a continuous variable. For conflicts that started after 2012, we imputed data from 2012. For any other missing values, we imputed data from either two years before or two years after.

Rugged Terrain (*Rugged)*
The measure of rugged terrain used comes from Nunn and Puga (2012). Ruggedness is defined as the variability or irregularity in elevation (highs and lows) within a sampled terrain unit. In their calculation, ruggedness is measured in hundreds of meters of elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds (926 meters on the equator or any meridian) apart.

[5] This number is slightly higher than 100%, which suggests some problems with the data. However, these figures seem more accurate to those used in Haber and Menaldo (2011), where the population of the Republic of Yemen is the same that the population of Yemen AR in 1990.

Democracy (*Libdem_imp*)
We used the liberal democracy index from V-dem V10 (Coppedge et al., 2020; Pemstein et al., 2020). This index goes from 0 (low) to 1 (high) democracy. This index "takes a 'negative' view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account" (Coppedge et al., 2020; p. 43). It covers a period between 1789-2019. We imputed data from either two years before or two years after for missing values.

Oil exporter (*Oil_imp*)
A dummy variable that indicates if more than the 33% of the merchandise exports are fuel exports. We followed Fearon and Laitin's (2003) procedure and used data from the World Development Indicators.[6] For the remaining missing values, we applied two approaches. First, we imputed data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). However, there were some remaining missing values after 2000, and we used data from The Observatory of Economic Complexity[7] to impute them.[8]

Ethnic Fractionalization (*Ethfrac*)
This variable come from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Drazanova (2019). It goes from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates a totally homogeneous country and 1 a completely ethnically fractionalized country.

New States (*Nwstate*)
This variable comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and it is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the first two years after independence. We manually coded this variable to 2016.

Region (*Region*)
Variable indicating the region of a country from the following groups: (i) Eurasia; (ii) Asia; (iii) Middle East and North Africa; (iv) Sub-Saharan Africa; and (v) Latin American and the Caribbean. This variable is taken from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and manually coded for the new cases in the dataset.

Duration (*Duration*)
The number of months that a given civil war lasts. We calculated this following the month/year of start and month/year of end provided by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).

Battledeaths (*Bdbest, Ldead, Bdhigh)*
This variable comes from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and estimates the number of battle deaths in civil wars. This dataset defines battledeaths as deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat. We use their best estimate (*bdbes*t) and the log of the best estimate for the analyses (*ldead*). We run robustness checks with their high estimate (*bdhigh*)

[6] The identifier of the series is: TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN
[7] https://oec.world/en
[8] The countries with imputed values are Somalia, Namibia, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Chad, Libya and the Arab Republic of Syria.

Post 1990 (*Post1990*)
A binary variable that indicates if the conflicts started after the year 1990.

Diplomacy (*Diplomacy*)
A binary variable from Huang (2016) that indicates if the main rebel group of the civil war established offices abroad, sent emissaries abroad or to an international organization, or established a foreign affairs arm within its movement.

Rebel Governance Institutions (*Govern*)
Number of rebel governance institutions, as measured by Stewart (2021).

State capacity (*Capacity*)
Index of state capacity by Hanson and Sigman (2021).

Prewar state capacity (*Pre_capacity*)
Capacity index in the year before the war started.

Postwar state capacity (*Post_capacity*)
Capacity index in the year after the war ended (*post_capacity*). We only code this variable for civil wars that started before 1991 and that were not won by rebels. Hanson and Sigman do not have data on state capacity for 2016, so we impute the value of *post_capacity* in Colombia (COL2) for 2016 from the 2015 value. State capacity went up in Colombia from 2015 to 2016 according to the *Sci_Comp* measure (O'Reilly and Murphy 2022) so this imputation is reasonable and conservative. There are no other cases of civil wars ending in 2015 for which we can perform a similar imputation.

Difference in state capacity (*Capacity_diff*)
Difference between the capacity index in the year after the war ended (*post_capacity*) minus the capacity index in the year before the war started (*pre_capacity*). We only compute this for civil wars that started before 1991 and that were not won by rebels, which is the universe of cases for which we analyze this variable (Table 7, Table B.7).

Comprehensive state capacity (*Sci_comp*)
Index of comprehensive state capacity by O'Reilly and Murphy (2022).

Prewar comprehensive state capacity (*Pre_sci_comp*)
Comprehensive state capacity index in the year before the war started.

Postwar comprehensive state capacity (*Post_sci_comp*)
Comprehensive state capacity index in the year after the war ended. We only code this variable for civil wars that started before 1991 and that were not won by rebels.

Difference in comprehensive state capacity (*Sci_comp_diff*)
Difference between the comprehensive state capacity index in the year after the war ended (*post_sci_comp*) minus the comprehensive state capacity index in the year before the war started (*pre_sci_comp*). We only code this variable for civil wars that started before 1991 and that were not won by rebels, which is the universe of cases for which we analyze this variable (Table 7, Table B.7).

III. Descriptive statistics

Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics. Panel Dataset

Variable	Obs	Cases	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	%
RS rebels (dummy)	1399	178		0.47	0	1	34.4%
Type of Rebel							
Rev Socialist	1399	178		0.4	0	1	23.23%
Secessionist	1399	178		0.5	0	1	32.52%
MNL	1399	178		0.3	0	1	11.15%
Other	1399	178		0.5	0	1	33.10%
Technology of Rebellion							
Conventional	1399	178		0.4	0	1	18.08%
Irregular	1399	178		0.4	0	1	72.05%
SNC	1399	178		0.3	0	1	9.86%
External Support							
Rebex	1399	178		0.5	0	1	57.61%
Gvtex	1399	178		0.39	0	1	81.84%
Other							
GDP per capita (constant 2011$)	1391	177	3,450.7	3306.9	89	29,766	
Population (in thousands)	1399	178	105,106.6	250775.0	534	1,268,155	
Military Personnel (in thousands)	1380	177	331.9	892.7	0	12,500	
Rugged Terrain	1395	177	1.3	0.9	0	5.3	
New State	1399	178		0.3	0	1	12.29%
Democracy	1381	177	0.2	0.2	0	0.6	
Oil Exporter	1399	178		0.4	0	1	20.23%
Capacity	1269	154	-0.45	0.67	-2.31	1.43	

Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics. Cross-sectional Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	%
Outcome						
Incumbent Lost	157		0.43	0	1	24.2%
Draw	157		0.433	0	1	24.8%
Incumbent Win	157		0.502	0	1	51%
Technology of Rebellion						
Conventional	178		0.476	0	1	34.3%
Irregular	178		0.5	0	1	53.4%
SNC	178		0.33	0	1	12.4%
Type of Rebel (warcat)						
Rev Socialist	178		0..370	0	1	16.29%
Secessionist	178		0.465	0	1	31.46%
MNL	178		0.251	0	1	6.74%
Other	178		0.499	0	1	45.51%
External Support						
Rebel External Support	178	1.64	1.006	0	3	
Government External Support	178	2.096	1.056	0	3	
Other						
GDP per capita (constant 2011$)	177	3,632.23	4,118.41	89.03	29,157.14	
Population (in thousands)	177	59,670.05	142,617.93	499	822	
Military Personnel (in thousands)	176	343.73	945.51	0	5,112	
Rugged Terrain	177	1.316	0.988	0.147	5.301	
Democracy	177	0.148	0.122	0.012	0.554	
Oil Exporter	178		0.419	0	1	22.5%
Ethnic Fractionalization	177	0.514	0.295	0.004	0.902	
Regions						
Eurasia	178		0.302	0	1	10.1%
Asia	178		0.433	0	1	24.7%
MENA	178		0.39	0	1	18.5%
Sub-Saharan Africa	178		0.487	0	1	38.2%
Latin America	178		0.279	0	1	8.4%
Conflict Severity						
Battle deaths best estimate	137	50,751.69	177,155.43	50	1,596,973	
Battle deaths high estimate	137	98,173.53	466,196.67	274	5,066,776	
Other Variables						
New State	178		0.317	0	1	11.2%
Post 1990	178		0.496	0	1	42.7%
Diplomacy	118		0.49	0	1	39%
Govern	121	3.57	2.97	0	10	
Duration	178	84.11	96.36	0	546	
Capacity (lagged one year)	141	-0.49	0.62	-2.31	1.2	
Sci_comp (lagged one year)	141	-1.53	1.34	-5.7	1.4	
Capacity_diff	53	0.18	0.43	-0.60	1.69	

Continued on next page

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	%
Sci_comp_diff	59	0.13	0.79	-2.00	3.07	
RS rebels (dummy)	178	0.23	0.42	0	1	23.03%
RSprogr (dummy)	178	0.24	0.43	0	1	24.72%

Table A.4. Descriptive Statistics by World Region

Variables	Eurasia	Asia	MENA	Sub-S. Africa	Latin America
RS rebels	0.05	0.38	0.31	0.09	0.46
	(0.23)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.28)	(0.51)
RS (not including MNL)	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.4
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.5)
Secessionist	0.9	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0)
MNL	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0
	(0)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0)
Other	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.6
	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Conventional	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Irregular	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.6
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
SNC	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1
	(0)	(0)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Incumbent Lost	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3
	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.5)
Draw	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Incumbent Win	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4
	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Duration (months)	38.1	134.9	65.3	69.7	97.4
	(28.3)	(135.4)	(70.1)	(65.3)	(124.9)
Govt External Support	1.2	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.9
	(1.2)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1)	(1.1)
Rebel External Support	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.3
	(1.3)	(1)	(1)	(0.9)	(0.9)
Battle deaths (best estimate)	23,313.4	115,548.9	35,907.6	24,176.3	14,762.6
	(38,917.6)	(319,742.4)	(47,224.4)	(41,771.4)	(17,448.2)
GDP per capita	7,008.6	2,106.3	7,880.9	1,508.6	4,195.0
	(3,264.5)	(1,852.9)	(6,436.1)	(1,068.8)	(1,797.2)
Population (thousands)	61,831.6	166,782.7	21,151.6	19,373.4	7,611.0
	(73,983.4)	(251,548)	(23,671.5)	(25,796.8)	(7,174.7)
Military Personnel (thousands)	1,320.5	587.8	234.0	41.6	26.5
	(2,121.1)	(1,068.1)	(305.4)	(52.2)	(33.7)
Democracy	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Oil Exporter	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.0
	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.3
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(0.3)

Note: The table displays mean of the variable in each of the regions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A.1. RS by Region and Historical Period




Table A.5. Type of Rebels (4-categorical variable), by Region

	RS	Secessionist	MNL	Others	Total
Eurasia	1 (3.45%)	16 (28.57%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.23%)	18 (10.1%)
Asia	14 (48.28%)	20 (35.71%)	3 (25.0%)	7 (8.64%)	44 (24.7%)
MENA	5 (17.24%)	5 (8.93%)	5 (41.7%)	18 (22.22%)	33 (18.5%)
Sub-Sah. Africa	2 (6.9%)	15 (26.8%)	4 (33.3%)	47 (58.02%)	68 (38.2%)
Lat.Am.	7 (21.14%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (9.88%)	15 (8.4%)
Total	29	56	12	81	178

Note: Column percentages.

Figure A.2. Type of Rebels (4-categorical variable) (1944-2016)




Figure A.3. Type of Rebels (4-categorical variable). Temporal Patterns




Table A.6. Type of Rebels (4-categorical variable) and Civil War Outcome (1944-2016)

	Rev. Socialist	Sec	MNL	Others	Total
Rebel Victory	6	9	4	19	38
	20.69%	17.31%	36.36%	29.23%	24.20%
Draw	7	11	3	18	39
	24.14%	21.15%	27.27%	27.69%	24.84%
Incumbent Won	16	32	4	28	80
	55.17%	61.54%	36.36%	43.08%	50.96%
Total	29	52	11	65	157
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: Column percentages

Figure A.4. Kaplan-Meier Estimates, by 4-Categorical Type of Rebels






Figure A.5 Civil War Duration by RS and Technology of Rebellion



Note: The graph shows, with the cross-sectional dataset, the average duration (in months) by rebel type (RS vs. not RS) and TR. It shows that irregular wars were longer than the other types, and that those fought by RS rebels were the longest. Among conventional civil wars, RS rebels are also associated with the longest conflicts. While the patterns are different for SNC wars, only 1 civil war dominated by RS rebels was fought as a SNC war (the 1958 Lebanese Civil War); 6 were fought conventionally, and 34 were fought irregularly.


Figure A.6 Log of Battledeaths by RS and Technology of Rebellion



Note: The graph shows the average log of battledeaths by rebel type (RS vs. not RS) and TR. It shows that conventional wars were deadlier than the other types, and that those fought by RS rebels were the deadliest. Among irregular civil wars, RS rebels are also associated with the deadliest conflicts. While the patterns are different for SNC wars, only 1 civil war dominated by RS rebels was fought as a SNC war (the 1958 Lebanese Civil War); 6 were fought conventionally, and 34 were fought irregularly.

IV. Maps

Map A.1. RS rebels across the globe



Note: Marxist equals RS rebels, thus it includes both Revolutionary Socialist and Marxist National Liberation rebels.

Section B. Additional Analyses

Table B.1. Cox Regressions on Civil War Duration with 4-Categorical Rebel Type Variable

	M1	M2	M3	M4
RS	0.49**	0.44**	0.49**	0.58+
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Sec	0.65*	0.56**	0.70+	0.68+
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)
MNL	0.41**	0.36**	0.45**	0.51*
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Rebel Ext. support (dummy)		0.88	0.89	0.85
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Govt. Ext. support (dummy)		0.46**	0.47**	0.51**
		(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.11)
GDP per capita			1.05*	1.02
			(0.021)	(0.024)
Rugged Terrain			1.00	0.96
			(0.081)	(0.094)
Population			1.00	1.00
			(0.00049)	(0.00051)
Democracy			0.34	0.50
			(0.24)	(0.37)
Oil			1.00	0.96
			(0.19)	(0.19)
Military Personnel (Log)			0.86**	0.85**
			(0.041)	(0.048)
Regional dummies	-	-	-	✓
Observations	1399	1399	1348	1348
Pseudo R^2	0.011	0.024	0.029	0.034

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). GDP per capita and Population are in thousands.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2. Robustness Cox Regressions on Civil War Duration, with Capacity (HS)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
RS Rebels	0.57**	0.64*	0.56**	0.64+	0.57*	0.73
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Capacity (HS)		0.93	1.00	1.12	1.16	1.09
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Rebel Ext Supp (dummy)			1.29	1.26		
			(0.26)	(0.26)		
Govt Ext Supp (dummy)			0.42**	0.50**		
			(0.097)	(0.13)		
Rugged Terrain				1.03	1.06	1.06
				(0.12)	(0.094)	(0.11)
Population				1.00+	1.00**	1.00*
				(0.0009)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)
Oil Exporter				1.05	1.18	1.06
				(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)
Regional dummies	-	-	-	✓	-	✓
Observations	1399	1269	1269	1266	1266	1266
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.005	0.021	0.045	0.02	0.036

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). Population is in thousands. Some covariates from the main Cox models have been excluded due to correlation with the Capacity measure, or because of violation of the proportionality assumption. Rebel and Govt Ext. Support are included as dummy variables; they are excluded from some models for robustness as diagnostic tests revealed that these variables might violate the proportional hazards assumption.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Figure B.1. Logit on RS rebels. Marginal Effects




Table B.3. OLS on Conflict Severity, with Log of High Estimate of Battledeaths

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
RS Rebels	1.08**	0.87**	0.57+	0.93*	0.63+
	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Govt External Support		0.16	0.053	0.12	0.053
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Rebel External Support		0.60**	0.59**	0.65**	0.60**
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Duration			0.0058**		0.0072**
			(0.0011)		(0.0011)
Constant	9.31**	8.05**	7.82**	7.91**	7.74**
	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.46)
Covariates	–	–	–	✓	✓
Observations	137	137	137	136	136
R^2	0.069	0.205	0.303	0.342	0.472

Note: All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). Covariates in M4 and M5 include GDP per capita, Population, Oil Exporter, Ethnic Fractionalization, New State, Democracy Index, Military Personnel, and Region dummies.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.4. OLS on Conflict Severity, with 4-Categorical Rebel Type

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Rev. Socialist	1.16*	1.15*	0.74+	0.89+	0.47
	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.53)	(0.46)
Sec	0.072	0.39	0.15	-0.072	-0.35
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.37)
MNL	1.19*	0.98+	0.41	0.85	0.22
	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.42)	(0.58)	(0.46)
Government External Support		0.16	0.033	0.16	0.086
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Rebel External Support		0.70**	0.67**	0.74**	0.68**
		(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Duration			0.0066**		0.0084**
			(0.0012)		(0.0011)
Constant	8.66**	7.08**	6.98**	7.14**	6.95**
	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.55)
Covariates	-	-	-	✓	✓
Observations	137	137	137	136	136
R^2	0.070	0.224	0.335	0.338	0.496

Note: All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). Covariates in M4 and M5 include GDP per capita, Population, Oil Exporter, Ethnic Fractionalization, New State, Democracy Index, Military Personnel, and Region dummies.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.5. Multinomial Logit on Conflict Outcome

	Rebel Victory		Draw	
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
RS Rebels	0.069	0.11	0.034	0.091
	(0.45)	(0.71)	(0.45)	(0.55)
Constant	-0.76**	-0.71	-0.73**	-1.54
	(0.23)	(1.09)	(0.23)	(0.94)
Covariates	–	✓	–	✓
Observations	157	156	157	156
Pseudo R^2	0.000	0.180	0.000	0.180

Note: Multinomial Logistic Model; Incumbent Victory is the base category. All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). Covariates in M2 and M4 include Government and Rebel external support, GDP per capita, Population, Oil Exporter, Ethnic Fractionalization, New State, Democracy Index, Military Personnel, Post 1990, and Region.
$+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table B.6. Probit on Rebel Diplomacy and Rebel Governance

	Rebel Governance		Rebel Diplomacy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
RS rebels	0.8863**	1.2362**	0.5045†	0.9406*
	(0.3743)	(0.5412)	(0.2586)	(0.3631)
Constant	0.6929**	0.5140	−0.4307**	−0.7021
	(0.1482)	(0.5935)	(0.1421)	(0.5807)
Covariates	–	✓	–	✓
Num. Obs.	121	108	118	117
Wald χ^2	5.61	40.58	3.81	20.76
Prob $> \chi^2$	0.0179	0.0001	0.0511	0.1080
Log Pseudolikelihood	−55.4699	−40.1784	−76.9753	−67.7992
Pseudo R^2	0.0574	0.2816	0.0244	0.1303

Note: All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.7. RS and State Capacity Growth, with Civil War Duration

	M1	M2	M3	M4
RS	0.27+	0.28	0.61**	0.58*
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Prewar Capacity (HS)	-0.29**	-0.30**		
	(0.11)	(0.081)		
Prewar Capacity (OM)			-0.21**	-0.18**
			(0.071)	(0.066)
Government External Support		0.083		0.19+
		(0.053)		(0.095)
Duration	0.0014*	0.0012*	0.00026	-0.00023
	(0.00053)	(0.00057)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Constant	-0.20*	-0.48*	-0.39**	-0.56+
	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.30)
Regional dummies		✓		✓
Observations	53	53	59	59
R^2	0.304	0.36	0.228	0.29

Note: All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).
The universe of cases in this table are civil wars that started before 1991 and that were not won by the rebels.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.8. RS and Severity and Duration Factor

	M1	M2	M3
RS Rebels	0.24**	0.21**	0.17*
	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.081)
Government External Support		0.037	0.019
		(0.026)	(0.029)
Rebel External Support		0.057+	0.085*
		(0.034)	(0.037)
Constant	-0.066**	-0.23**	-0.29**
	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.085)
Covariates	–	–	✓
Observations	137	137	136
R^2	0.101	0.158	0.259

Note: All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses). Covariates in M3 include GDP per capita, Population, Oil Exporter, Ethnic Fractionalization, New State, Democracy Index, Military Personnel, and Region dummies.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

The factor analysis was conducted to better capture the shared variation between conflict severity and conflict duration, addressing the potential limitations of examining these dimensions separately. By combining them into a single composite measure, we aim to derive a more comprehensive indicator of rebel effectiveness. We first standardize the variables to ensure comparability, then perform the factor analysis to extract a latent factor representing the common variance between severity and duration. Factor scores are computed for each observation and used as the dependent variable in replication models of Table 4 (with duration removed from the right-hand side). The results in Table B.8 indicate that RS rebels are associated with higher levels of this composite measure, suggesting that they tend to engage in conflicts that are both longer and more severe.[9]

[9] We have run these analyses using Stata 18 (the code is included in the replication do file), but they are consistent when we run them in R.

Section C. Proportionality diagnostic tests


We have run this test for the different models we have run and for all the models presented in the paper and SM. Here we present diagnostic tests for M3 of Table 3 in the main paper, which is one of the multivariate models that provides supportive results of our hypothesis that RS rebels fight longer civil wars. Figure C.1 presents Scaled Schoenfeld residuals plots, which in all the cases shows horizontal lines. Table C.1 reports a formal test based on the scaled Schoenfeld residuals that indicates that all the individual covariates pass the proportional hazards assumption and that the model as a whole (the global test) also passes the assumption.

Table C.1. Test of proportional-hazards assumption

	Rho	Chi2	df	Prob>chi2
RS rebels	0.03045	0.20	1	0.6526
Rebel Ext Support (dummy)	0.07285	1.08	1	0.2986
Gvt Ext Support (dummy)	0.09151	2.04	1	0.1527
GDP per capita	0.06343	0.52	1	0.4707
Rugged	-0.01050	0.02	1	0.8880
Population	0.00932	0.02	1	0.8991
Democracy	0.02669	0.15	1	0.7021
Oil exporter	0.05183	0.44	1	0.5074
Log of Mil. Personnel	0.00214	0.00	1	0.9801
Global test		7.27	9	0.6085

Note: Robust variance–covariance matrix used.

Figure C.1. Scaled Schoenfeld residuals



Section D. Causal Mediation Analysis on Civil War Duration

We use causal mediation analysis to analyze the effect of RS on civil war duration, as this is likely mediated by irregular warfare (measured at war onset). Yet, how much of this effect is mediated? The approach we followed for mediation analysis uses the mediation package and the Stata *medeff* command (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010; Hicks and Tingley 2011). Using the cross-sectional dataset, we examine duration (in months) as a dependent variable, RS rebels as an independent variable, and irregular war as a mediator.

Table D.1. Mediation Analysis on Civil War Duration

	M1	M2
Mediator:		
Irregular	59.53^{**}	62.75^{**}
Mediated Effects		
ACME	23.44^{**}	26.93^{**}
Direct Effect	36.42^{**}	$29.09^{\dagger}$
Total Effect	59.86^{**}	56.02^{**}
% of Total Effect Mediated	39.31%	48.06%
Observations	178	177

Note: ACME stands for Average Causal Mediation Effect. M1 includes no control variables. M2 includes the following controls: Govt External Support, Rebel External Support, and GDP per capita.
$+ \ p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The results in Table D.1 show that RS rebels have both a direct effect on civil war duration and an effect mediated by irregular war; in the model without controls, approximately 39% of the total effect of the RS on duration is mediated by irregular war. The effects are robust (though at a lower significance level) to the inclusion as controls of external support (for both rebels and governments) and GDP per capita. These analyses are therefore supportive of the theory. They suggest both that the decision to engage in irregular warfare was largely influenced by a RS ideology and had implications on conflict duration, and that RS political ideology's direct effect on civil war characteristics –such as duration– should not be overlooked.

Section F. Full Tables

Full Table for Table 4. OLS on Civil War Severity

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
RS Rebels	1.14**	0.91**	0.57+	0.91*	0.58
	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.35)
Govt External Support		0.15	0.029	0.16	0.084
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Rebel External Support		0.67**	0.66**	0.75**	0.70**
		(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Duration			0.0067**		0.0082**
			(0.0011)		(0.0011)
GDP per capita				0.000027	0.000054
				(0.000041)	(0.000039)
Population				0.0000019	0.0000017
				(0.0000014)	(0.0000014)
Oil Exporter				0.43	0.60
				(0.42)	(0.38)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.62	0.22
				(0.66)	(0.61)
New State				-0.95	-1.22*
				(0.67)	(0.56)
Democracy Index				-4.31**	-5.73**
				(1.28)	(1.11)
Military Personnel				-0.000054	-0.000069
				(0.00024)	(0.00024)
Eurasia				0.63	1.01
				(0.74)	(0.65)
Asia				0.71	0.69
				(0.59)	(0.47)
MENA				0.26	0.19
				(0.55)	(0.41)
Sub-Saharan Africa				-0.31	-0.12
				(0.51)	(0.44)
				(.)	(.)
Constant	8.70**	7.34**	7.08**	7.13**	6.94**
	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.57)	(0.52)
Observations	137	137	137	136	136
R^2	0.069	0.216	0.332	0.338	0.491

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).

The reference category for Region is Latin America.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table B.3. OLS on Conflict Severity, with Log of High Estimate of Battledeaths

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
RS Rebels	1.08**	0.87**	0.57+	0.93*	0.63+
	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Govt External Support		0.16	0.053	0.12	0.053
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Rebel External Support		0.60**	0.59**	0.65**	0.60**
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Duration			0.0058**		0.0072**
			(0.0011)		(0.0011)
GDP per capita				0.000019	0.000043
				(0.000037)	(0.000036)
Population				0.0000024+	0.0000022+
				(0.0000013)	(0.0000013)
Oil Exporter				0.30	0.45
				(0.40)	(0.36)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.33	-0.012
				(0.58)	(0.53)
New State				-0.94	-1.17*
				(0.61)	(0.51)
Democracy Index				-4.97**	-6.22**
				(1.17)	(1.21)
Military Personnel				-0.00014	-0.00016
				(0.00022)	(0.00023)
Eurasia				0.86	1.19+
				(0.68)	(0.60)
Asia				1.12+	1.10*
				(0.57)	(0.45)
MENA				0.50	0.44
				(0.55)	(0.41)
Sub-Saharan Africa				0.19	0.36
				(0.47)	(0.38)
Constant	9.31**	8.05**	7.82**	7.91**	7.74**
	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.46)
Observations	137	137	137	136	136
R^2	0.069	0.205	0.303	0.342	0.472

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).

The reference category for Region is Latin America.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table B.4. OLS on Conflict Severity, with 4-Categorical Rebel Type

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Rev. Socialist	1.16*	1.15*	0.74+	0.89+	0.47
	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.53)	(0.46)
Secessionist	0.072	0.39	0.15	-0.072	-0.35
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.37)
MNL	1.19*	0.98+	0.41	0.85	0.22
	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.42)	(0.58)	(0.46)
Govt External Support		0.16	0.033	0.16	0.086
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Rebel External Support		0.70**	0.67**	0.74**	0.68**
		(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Duration			0.0066**		0.0084**
			(0.0012)		(0.0011)
GDP per capita				0.000029	0.000062+
				(0.000041)	(0.000036)
Population				0.0000019	0.0000018
				(0.0000014)	(0.0000014)
Oil Exporter				0.43	0.59
				(0.43)	(0.38)
Ethnic Fractionalization				0.64	0.32
				(0.68)	(0.61)
New State				-0.94	-1.19*
				(0.68)	(0.56)
Democracy Index				-4.32**	-5.83**
				(1.32)	(1.14)
Military Personnel				-0.000052	-0.000059
				(0.00024)	(0.00024)
Eurasia				0.66	1.21+
				(0.77)	(0.69)
Asia				0.74	0.83+
				(0.62)	(0.48)
MENA				0.28	0.29
				(0.58)	(0.42)
Sub-Saharan Africa				-0.30	-0.057
				(0.52)	(0.45)
Constant	8.66**	7.08**	6.98**	7.14**	6.95**
	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.55)
Observations	137	137	137	136	136
R^2	0.070	0.224	0.335	0.338	0.496

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).

The reference category for Region is Latin America. The reference category for Rebel Type is Others

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table B.5. Multinomial Logit on Conflict Outcome

	Rebel Victory		Draw	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
RS Rebels	0.069	0.11	0.034	0.091
	(0.45)	(0.71)	(0.45)	(0.55)
Eurasia		-0.35		-1.22
		(1.45)		(1.47)
Asia		0.25		-0.27
		(0.91)		(0.87)
MENA		-2.63*		-1.07
		(1.15)		(0.99)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-0.046		-0.26
		(0.96)		(0.83)
Population		-0.0000027		-0.0000036
		(0.0000026)		(0.0000024)
Oil Exporter		-0.52		-1.01
		(0.65)		(0.70)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-1.24		0.028
		(1.06)		(0.92)
New State		-1.20		-0.0056
		(0.73)		(0.79)
Democracy Index		-3.91		-0.18
		(2.74)		(1.99)
Military Personnel		-0.00014		-0.00027
		(0.00037)		(0.00055)
Govt External Support		-0.35		0.14
		(0.25)		(0.24)
Rebel External Support		0.97**		0.50+
		(0.29)		(0.26)
Post 1990		1.29*		1.22*
		(0.60)		(0.55)
GDP per capita		0.00011		0.000046
		(0.000072)		(0.000074)
Constant	-0.76**	-0.71	-0.73**	-1.54
	(0.23)	(1.09)	(0.23)	(0.94)
Observations	157	156	157	156
Pseudo R^2	0.000	0.180	0.000	0.180

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).

The reference category for Region is Latin America.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table B.6. Probit on Rebel Diplomacy and Rebel Governance

	Rebel Governance		Rebel Diplomacy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
RS Rebels	0.89*	1.24*	0.50+	0.94**
	(0.37)	(0.54)	(0.26)	(0.36)
GDP per capita		-0.00013*		-0.000031
		(0.000052)		(0.000044)
Population		-0.0000013		0.0000051**
		(0.0000021)		(0.0000019)
Rugged Terrain		0.32		-0.087
		(0.22)		(0.15)
Democracy Index		-0.79		-2.27
		(1.55)		(1.54)
Oil Exporter		0.82+		0.59+
		(0.47)		(0.35)
Military Personnel		-0.00043		-0.00078+
		(0.00058)		(0.00043)
Ethnic Fractionalization		1.05		0.60
		(0.69)		(0.49)
New State		0.093		-0.37
		(0.59)		(0.40)
Post 1990		0.16		-0.21
		(0.40)		(0.34)
Eurasia		0		1.31
		(.)		(0.85)
Asia		1.33*		0.12
		(0.68)		(0.55)
MENA		0.11		0.045
		(0.75)		(0.57)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.19+		0.21
		(0.64)		(0.52)
Constant	0.69**	0.51	-0.43**	-0.70
	(0.15)	(0.59)	(0.14)	(0.58)
Observations	121	108	118	117
Pseudo R^2	0.057	0.282	0.024	0.130

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).

The reference category for Region is Latin America.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table B.8. RS and Severity and Duration Factor

	M1	M2	M3
RS Rebels	0.24**	0.21**	0.17*
	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.081)
Govt External Support		0.037	0.019
		(0.026)	(0.029)
Rebel External Support		0.057+	0.085*
		(0.034)	(0.037)
GDP per capita			-0.0000031
			(0.0000065)
Population			-0.000000016
			(0.00000024)
Oil Exporter			-0.033
			(0.054)
Ethnic Fractionalization			-0.0055
			(0.11)
New State			0.010
			(0.11)
Democracy Index			0.094
			(0.29)
Military Personnel			0.000053
			(0.000042)
Eurasia			-0.083
			(0.13)
Asia			0.19
			(0.15)
MENA			0.013
			(0.10)
Sub-Saharan Africa			0.018
			(0.087)
Constant	-0.066**	-0.23**	-0.29**
	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.085)
Observations	137	137	136
R^2	0.101	0.158	0.259

All models report robust clustered standard errors by conflict (in parentheses).
The reference category for Region is Latin America.
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Full Table for Table D.1. Mediation Analysis on Civil War Duration

	M1	M2
Mediator:		
Irregular	59.53**	62.75**
Mediated Effects		
ACME	23.44**	26.93**
Direct Effect	36.42**	29.09†
Total Effect	59.86**	56.02**
% of Total Effect Mediated	39.31%	48.06%
Covariates		
Rebel External Support		9.09
		(7.18)
Govt External Support		17.2*
		(6.73)
GDP per capita		-0.0017
		(0.0016)
Constant	44**	-0.78
	(9.89)	(20.3)
Observations	178	177

Note: ACME stands for Average Causal Mediation Effect.
$+ \ p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

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